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With   the  advent  of the   1970's a new development arose  upon the 
international economic scene,   that  of the American multinational  corpo- 
ration.     In   the wake of this development  numerous economic effects  with 
respect  to employment,   income,  and   labor standards   resulted.     These 
effects   have  had  and will continue to have  a  profound   impact  upon the 
American   labor  force.     It was  the   purpose of  this  thesis  to   investigate 
the  operations of   this new corporate concept with a thorough exploration 
of   its effects  'ipon American  labor.     It was  hypothesized that   unemploy- 
ment could   result   from the  outflows  of capital  and  technology by multi- 
nationals . 
The   procedures  employed  were   two:     An   intensive   investigation  of 
the   recent   literature  on  labor and   international  economics was made: 
Similarly,  current   statistical  data were  gathered.     However,   no complex 
statistical correlations were  utilized.     Presentation of both organized 
labor's and  the corporation's  arguments was  made.    An objective  view- 
point was  then attempted  by the  writer. 
Due to  the   unavailability of   relevant data on this  phenomenon,   the 
results  of this  study were  necessarily  inconclusive.    Conditionally,   it 
was concluded   that  unemployment was   likely to be  felt  in  the American 
labor force when direct multinational   investment was   permitted.     Never- 
theless,   these effects   might  be mitigated  as   income  from this   investment 
flowed  back to the American economy.     Enough   information was  presented, 
however,   to suggest   that American  labor standards and wage conditions  must 
become,   the   international   norm   in order to counteract any such effects. 
Protectionist   proposals,   aa embodied   in the   pending Burke-Hartke Act, 
were   rejected as   less  desirable. 
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CHAHER   I 
STATEMENT  OF THE  tROaLiSM 
Introductory Statements 
In the economic arena,   the decades of   the   1950's  and   1960's were 
two of   the most complex periods   in  the  relatively brief history of the 
United States.    Adding to this complexity were  two significant develop- 
ments.       Domestically,   these  two periods were marked   by the  rise  of "big" 
business and  giant corporate mergers;   internationally,   they were dis- 
tinguished  by the  greatest   increase   in  trade and   investment the   business 
world  has ever witnessed.       It was  through these   two developments  that 
the stage was   set  for the  emergence  of  the main economic phenomenon in 
the   1970's—the multinational corporation. 
What   is   this  relatively new economic concept?    How is   it defined, 
organized,  and what  is  the extent of   its  pervasiveness?    Why has   the 
multinational  corporation generated  so much controversy and   influenced 
so much of Western trade  for   the  last  fifteen  years?    Before   these  ques- 
tions are answered,  it must  be   pointed  out that  international organiza- 
tions,   such as  the  multinational firm,  are  not new. 
Louis Turner,  a  British economist,   states, 
"In  the  1760's,   such wide-reaching companies  as  the East 
India Company or the  Massachusetts   Bay Colony were  licensed 
by the British crown to make profits.     The nineteenth century 
saw international   companies formed  to exploit Central America's 
banana  republics or Africa's copper belt.    And  again,   in  the 
early parts of this century, American companies   like National 
Cash Register,   Eastman Kodak,   Singer,  Coca-Cola,   Quaker Oats, 
and Woolworth were all active  outside the United States." 
, 
Richard Hays  of Tulane University writes, 
"William Lever   (in the  1920*s)of Britain founded what 
was  perhaps   the first  real mutinational firm when he estab- 
lished extensive manufacturing and distribution facilities 
in many foreign countries.    All  these firms were united  by 
a strong organization designed  to accomodate   the multinational 
nature  of the  company." 
Raymond Vernon,  of  Harvard,  estimates  there were  approximately seventy- 
five to 100  U.  S.   firms  already manufacturing outside   borders of  the 
U.   S.   by the   turn of the  twentieth century.       Thus, although the  contro- 
versy surrounding  the multinational  corporation is  recent,  the  phenome- 
non  itself   is  not;   it has appeared  numerous  times  throughout the   history 
of the Western world. 
Definitions  of Multinational  Corporation 
If   the above discussion does  nothing else,   it shows  that the opera- 
tions  of  the multinational  firms are   international  in design.    However, 
a  more comprehensive definition is needed   in order for the  reader to 
fully grasp the economic   dimensions   of  this phenomenon.     While many 
different definitions exist concerning the multinational firms,   there 
are some  certain common characteristics. 
Louis Turner and Richard Hays essentially describe the multi- 
national  corporation as any firm which has a number of directly con- 
trolled  operations   in different countries.5    Professor Vernon posits 
another definition;   to him the  multinational  firm is 
a company that  attempts  to carry out   its activities on an 
international  scale,   as  though there were  no rational 
boundaries,  on the  basis of a common strategy directed 
from a corporate center  ...   (its) affiliates are   locked 
together  in an   integrated   process and  their  policies are 
determined   by the corporate center  in  terms of decisions 
relating to production,   plant  location,   product mix, 
marketing,   financing   ..."6 
To these characteristics,   Mr.  Jacques  Maisonrouge,   President of  IBM«S 
World Trade Corporation, adds  the  necessity of stock ownership.      A 
3 
final   position,   one which will appear  throughout  this  thesis,   is stated 
by one Sir Arnold  Hall  of  England.     "A multinational  corporation," he 
relates,   "is an American-registered   company manufacturing  its   products 
where   labour  is  cheapest,   and channelling   its  profits  to another country 
where  taxation   is   lowest  or preferably nonexistant. No matter how 
these definitions  might diverge   they all contain one   important charac- 
teristic.     The  firm,   instead of  exporting and   importing production, 
chooses to  invest   in a  "host" country and  produce   internally in  that 
country. 
Types and Organizational   Structure 
A point  must  be   injected  at  this   point   in conjunction with the 
above discussion.     If   international   (world)   production   is   the chief 
characteristic of all   multinational   corporations,   then  are all   firms 
which   invest   in an overseas'  market  classified as multinational   in  this 
sense?    The  answer   is  no.     In this  context,   it  is  necessary to examine 
the various  forms  of multinationals which have been classified  by 
Professor Jack Behrman  of the  University of North Carolina.    Although 
the distinctions   between  these forms may be  somewhat unclear,   they do 
represent a   starting point   in this   thesis for an analysis of  the multi- 
national  corporation. 
To  Professor  Behrman,  multinational   firms  are essentially classified 
into three  types:     "(1)   the   'classical'  or   'colonial,'   (2)  the   'inter- 
Q 
national  holding company'   and   (3)   the   'multinational enterprise:'" 
The "colonial" multinational,   it would  seem,   represents   imperialism  in 
its   highest  sense,   for organization   is done  solely for  the purpose of 
exploiting the  resources  of a   foreign country  in order that  the do- 
mestic  firm might  profit.10    On  the  other hand,   the  "international 
u 
holding company" is essentially set up for production mainly in the 
host market, and, as Behrman points out, each country is treated as 
independent of   the others   in  relationship  to sales and exports. It 
is with the  third  form of  multinationals,   however,   that  the  previously- 
mentioned  characteristic,   that of   international production,   becomes 
most evident;   for  it is this   type of firm,   the  "multinational enter- 
prise," that  has as   its  main objective,   the welding of "its foreign 
affiliates   into an operational entity,   integrated with the activities 
of the  parent,   to serve   the world  market."12    Thus,   through this  third 
area of multinationals,  has flowed much of   the American foreign  in- 
vestment   in the  past two decades;  consequently,  emphasis will  be 
placed,   throughout the   remainder of  this   thesis, on this type  of  firm. 
As can easily be seen   in the above   presentation,   the concept of 
the multinational   corporation is   rather complex,   involving numerous 
variables.     Not  the   least of  these variables   is   the organizational 
structure  of  this  type  of  firm.     As  should be  evident by now,   the multi- 
national firm,   because  of   its great size,  must   be orgnaized within the 
substructure of   our American corporations;   however,   only the  largest 
possess the  necessary economies  of  scale  for this type  of  structure. 
As Dr.   Virgil  Salera of California State College  notes,   the American 
multinational enterprise   is  unlike either:     (1)   the American "uni- 
national" company, which has   no foreign segment of operations,  or 
(2)   the   "classical" corporation,  which essentially involves  dealing 
with foreign entities  through an export department of  the domestic 
firm.13    To Dr.  Salera,  the American multinational corporation must   in- 
volve a number of specialized divisions;       however as complex as   these 
divisions are,   it must be  pointed out that direct control for all 
foreign operations   is still essentially maintained  by the parent com- 
pany,  much  like the domestic corporation  itself.     Furthermore,  al- 
though  the multinational corporation may be complicated   in   its   in- 
ternal organization,   the  various methods  by which  its foreign opera- 
tions are conducted are  more easily discernible.    These may  include: 
(1)  simple exporting,   (2)   licensing,   (3)   the  joint venture,   (ft)  the 
wholly-owned   venture,  or  (5)   combinations of  each. 
A  large capacity for operations,  utilizing the above  divisions  to 
their fullest, would  thus  seem to be  the  prime  requisite  for  inter- 
national   investment.     If  this statement  is   true,   if  large economics of 
scale are  important  for the overseas*   investment decision,   then how 
has  this  been shown in relationship to American direct  investment over 
the past fifteen  years?    No precise  data can be obtained,  but excel- 
lent estimates  have   been made describing the  number of American corpo- 
rations   investing overseas.     from these estimates evidence has been 
found   indicating  that  the majority of direct foreign  investment has 
been accounted  for mainly by the very large firms, those that could 
clearly be classified as  "multinational."     From a survey of  Fortune's 
(1966)   500 largest  corporations,   Professors Louis Wicks and Raymond 
Vernon have  found   that approximately 187 corporations, manufactnring 
in at least six or more countries—with more   than 2000 of the 2500 
"subsidiary countries"   in  the entire Fortune  group at  that  time — 
accounted  for nearly eighty  percent   (804)  of U.   S.  foreign  investment. 
These,   Professor Vernon  has  noted,  were situated mainly within the 
"multinational enterprise" group.16    Statistical  data  from the Commerce 
Department's Office of   Foreign Direct   Investment   (OFDI)  and  estimates 
from Professor Sidney Rolfe would  seem to conform to Professor Vernon's 
hypothesis.     In a survey of over  3,350 enterprises  subject  to its con- 
trol,   the OFDI   found   that  fewer  than  140 multinational corporations 
accounted  for nearly sixty percent   (60%)  of I).   S. direct   investment 
overseas.1      Professor Rolfe,  employing data from Fortune 's   500 
largest corporations   had   over twenty-five percent   (25%)  of  their 
1 ft assets, employment,  and  production overseas   in  the  mid-1960's.       Final- 
ly,   the   immensity of many U.  S.  multinational corporations  comes  clearly 
into focus when  it   is noted that General   Motors'  annual   revenue   is 
greater than any state   in the  Union;  when multinationals  like General 
Motors,  Standard Oil, and   Ford   have   annual  sales  greater than the gross 
national  product  of more   than   130 foreign countries; and when the 
fifty  largest firms   in the United States have   revenues  greater  than the 
fifty states. 
Necessary economies   of  scale would  thus  seem to be a major factor 
in the ability of the corporation to invest overseas.     With this charac- 
teristic,   such firms are   able  to obtain the  skilled manpower and  so- 
phisticated  management  they need to go multinational.    This,  trofessor 
Vernon notes,   is  the main  reason for   the "superiority" of  these  187 
firms,   both   in the American and  foreign markets. Tables   1 and   II   (see 
below)   further illustrate  this   point.     Table  I,   from a survey of 
Fortune's U. S.,   as well as foreign,   corporations,  gives  the vorld's 
fifty (50)   largest  industrial  firms   in 1970.     Of   the top 50,   37 are 
American;   of the  top 20,   18 are American.     (All  of  these  corporations, 
it must  be mentioned,   are  clearly among the giants   in American 
business.)21    Table   II shows the   profits,   in  1970,  of many of these 
major American firms.     It must   be noted that approximately forty per- 
cent   (40%)  of  these corporations'   revenue   has come  from overseas 
TABLE   I 
World's   Fifty Largest  Industrial   Firms 
Firm 
Headquarters- 
Nationality 
1969 Sales 
Billions  of 
U. S.   Dollars 
1. General  Motors U.  S. A. 24.3 
2. Standard Oil   (N.J.) U.   S.  A. 14.9 
3. Ford  Motor U.   S.   A. 14.8 
4. Royal  Dutch/Shell Group Netherlands/Britain 9.7 
5. General  Electric U.  S. A. 8.4 
6. IBM U.  S.  A. 7.2 
7. Chrysler U.   S.  A. 7.1 
8. Mobil Oil U.  S.  A. 6.6 
9. Unilever Netherlands/Britain 6.0 
10. Texaco U.  S. A. 5.9 
11. I.T.T. U.   S.  A. 5.5 
12. Gulf Oil U.   S.  A. 5.0 
13. Western Electric U.  S.  A. 4.9 
It. U. S.  Steel U.   S.  A. 4.8 
15. Standard Oil   (California) U.   S.  A. 3.8 
16. Ling-Temco-Vought U.   S.  A. 3.8 
17. OuPont   (E.I.)  de Nemours U.   S.  A. 3.7 
18. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken Netherlands 3.6 
19. Shell Oil U.   S.   A. 3.5 
20. Volkswagenwerk Germany 3.5 
21. West inghouse Electric U.   S. A. 3.5 
22. Standard Oil   (Ind.) U.   S. A. 3.5 
23. British Petroleum Britain 3.4 
24. General Telephone   & Electronics 0.   S.  A. 3.3 
25. Imperial  Chemical   Industries Britain 3.3 
26. Goodyear Tire & Rubber U.  S. A. 3.2 
27. R.  C.  A. U.   S.   A. 3.2 
28. Swift U.   S.   A. 3.1 
29. McDonnell  Douglas U.   S.  A. 3.0 
30. Union Carbide U.   S.   A. 3.0 
31. Bethlehem Steel U.   S.   A. 2.9 
32. British Steel Britain 2.9 
33. Aitachi Japan 2.9 
34. Boeing U.  S. A. 2.8 
35. Eastman Kodak U.   S.  A. 2.7 
36. Procter & Gamble U.  S.  A. 2.7 
37. Atlantic Richfield U.  S.  A. 2.7 
38. North American Rockwell U.   S.  A. 2.7 
39. International Harvester U.  S.  A. 2.7 
*o. Kraft Co. U.   3.  A. 2.6 
M. General  Dynamics U.   S.  A. 2.5 
42. Montecatini Edison Italy 2.5 
43. Tenneco U.   S.  A. 2.5 
44. Siemens Germany 2.4 
45. Continental  Oil U.   S. A. 2.4 
46. United Air Craft U.  S. A. 2.4 
47. British Leyland   Motor Britain 2.3 
48. Daimler-Benz Germany 2.3 
49. Fiat Italy 2.3 
50. Firestone Tire   & Rubber U.   S.   A. 2.3 
Source:     U.   S.   Firms,   Fortune,   March ,  1970,   p.   184;   Foreign Firms, 
Fortune, August,   1970,   p.   143. 
TAdLfci   II 
1970  Multinational   Profits 
Estimated Where  the 
Net Sales Foreign Sales ft Net  Income % Profits 
ComDanv                        (millions) (millions) Total (millions) Foreign Come  from 
Standard  Oil   (N.J.) $16,554 $8,277 50 1,310 52 Worldwide. 
Ford  Motor 14,980 3,900 26 516 27 Germany,  Bri 
tain, Aus- 
tralia. 
General Motors 18,752 3,563 19 609 19 Worldwide. 
Mobil  Oil 7,261 3,267 45 483 51 Canada, 
Middle East. 
International   Busi- 7,504 2,933 39 1,018 50 Worldwide. 
ness Machines 
International Tele- 6,365 2,673 42 353 35 Canada,  Eur- 
phone  & Telegraph ope,  L. Amer 
ica. 
Texaco 6,350 2,540 HO 822 NA* Worldwide. 
Gulf Oil 5,396 2,428 45 550 21 Middle East, 
S. America, 
Canada. 
Standard Oil  of 4,188 1,885 45 455 U6 Middle  East, 
California Indonesia, 
S. America. 
Chrysler 7,000 1,700 24 d   7.6* NA Worldwide. 
General  Electric 8,727 1,393 16 329 20 S. America, 
Canada,Jtalt 
Caterpillar Tractor 2,128 1,118 53 144 NA Export Sales 
Worldwide. 
Eastman Kodak 2,785 874 31 U04 19 Worldwide. 
Union Carbide 3,026 870 29 157 NA Worldwide. 
Procter & Gamble 3,178 795 25 238 25 Britain,  Eui 
ope .L.Americ 
International  Har- 2,712 680 25 52 NA Canada,Euro] 
vester Africa. 
Firestone Tire   & 2,335 677 29 93 39 Worldwide. 
Rubber 
E.   I.   duPont 3,618 634 18 329 NA Export  Sales 
Europe. 
Swift 3,076 U92 16 29 NA Canada,   Bri- 
tain,German; 
General Telephone  & 3.U39 441 13 236 7 Canada,Eur- 
Electronics ope,  L. Am- 
erica. 
Uniroyal 1,556 U20 27 24 75 Canada, 
Mexico. 
National Cash 1,421 643 US 30 51 Worldwide. 
Register 
NA    _    Not avai [able,     d - Deficit. 
Source:     "Multinational Profits,"   Forbes ,   November   15,   1971, p.   77. 
markets.22 Viewing these two tables, plus any annual edition of Fortune's 
500 largest U. S. corporations, one can readily see that I). S. corporation 
dominance as well as U. S. direct investment go hand in hand. The largest 
U.   S. corporations are  also  the   leading multinationals. 
Extent of Direct  Investment  by Multinationals 
The emergence of   the multinational  corporation as  a dominant force 
on the   international  scene   becomes even more apparent when the total 
investment  picture of  the United  States over the  past two decades   is 
analyzed.     (See  Table   III).     In   1950,   the   book value of all  U. S.   inter- 
national   investments   totaled approximately $54 billion;   in  1970,   this 
figure climbed   to $16/  billion,   representing a  growth   rate of  approxi- 
mately six percent  (fi%)   per vear.23    On the other hand,   in  1950 direct 
investment  by U.  S.   firms24 stood at   roughly $12 billion;   by 1970, 
however,   this figure  had  risen  to  $78.1  billion,   representing a growth 
rate of approximately ten  percent   (10%)   per year. Thus,   in   1950, 
foreign direct   investment was roughly twenty percent   (20*)  of   total 
U.  S.   domestic   investment;   by 1970  this  percentage was well  over one- 
half.     (By the end of  1971,   it   is   thought   that  this  book value would 
be well  over $84 billion.)26    An even greater significance of  the multi- 
national corporation's   influence on international   investment is high- 
lighted  it   the  book value of direct  investment  is related   to the United 
States*  share of world  trade,  sales,  and GNP.    According to Mr. Judd 
Polk of  the   International Chamber of Commerce,   there   is approximately 
a 2  to  1   ratio between  the  book value and asset value  of a country's 
investment   position.    Applying this  ratio to the  $/8.1  billion of direct 
investment   in  19/0,  one can quickly see  that  the total   asset  picture 
10 
IABLE   111 
International   Investment Position of  the United  States at Yearend 1950-70 
(millions of dollars) 
Total 
Type of   Investment 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970£/ 
Net International   Investment 
Position of  the 0. ft.  .   .   .   36,727         37,237         44,730 61,577 69,067 
U.S. assets and   invest- 
ments abroad,   total     .   .   .   54,359         65,076         85,589 120,374 166,574 
Private  investments   .....   19,004         29,136         49,310 31,528 119,890 
Long-term        17,488         26,750         44,497 71,375 104,693 
Direct        11,788         19,395         31,867 49,474 78,090 
Other      5,700             7,355         12,632 21,901 26,603 
Short-term assets 
and claims        1,516             2,386           4,313 10,153 15,197 
U.S.   Government  non-liquid 
credits and claims   .   .   .   .11,090           13,143         16,920 23,396 32,197 
Long-term credits.   .   .    .10,768           12,420         14,028 20,200 29,699 
Monetary reserve assets   .   .24,265           22,797         19,359 15,450 14,487 
Gold 22,820            21,753          17,804 13,806 11,072 
aNote:    Table   is  adapted   from more detailed   tables  published   in the Survey 
of  Current Business,   October 1970 and October  1971.    Of the data shown,   only 
the major underlined   items  add to totals. 
bFor foreign assets and  investments   in the  U.   S.,  see  U.S.   Department of 
Commerce,   Bureau of  International Commerce,  The Multinational Corporation: 
Studies on IK  S_.   Foreign  Investment,   Vol.   I,  Policy Aspects  of  Foreign In- 
vestment b£ U_.  S^ Multinational  Corporations   (Washington,   D.  C:    Government 
Printing Office,   1972),   p.   11. 
^/Provisional. 
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of U.  S.   investment  in 1970 may well   have been close  to $156 billion.27 
(Here again,  by the end   of 1971,  this  figure could  probably approach 
$200 billion). 
Which countries have  received  this direct   investment?    In what 
industries  has  this   investment   been greatest?    Data from the U.   S. 
Department of Commerce suggests  that  most of the United States*   foreign 
investment  has,   in the main,   gone to  the advanced countries such as 
Canada and  those  in Europe.     (See Table  IV.)     In  1970 about one-third 
($23  billion)  of  the total  foreign direct   investment of  $78.1 billion 
went to Canada,   one third   ($25 billion)   to Europe—with the  United 
Kingdom receiving  $8 billion,   Germany  $5 billion, and   France $2.16 
billion—and  the residual  to those countries   in Latin America, Africa, 
and  the  rest of  the world—notably Japan   ($1.5 billion)  and  Mexico 
($1.8 billion).2       (This,   as must be  noted,   followed  trends  previously 
established   in the  1960*s.)29    However,   in comparative  terms,  invest- 
ment  in Canada dropped from a   previous   high of thirty-five  percent 
(35%)   of  total foreign direct   investment abroad   in 1960 to thirty per- 
cent   (30%)   in 1970.     Investment   in Europe,   on the other hand,   rose  from 
twenty-one  percent   (21%)   in  1960 to thirty-one  percent   (31%)   in 1970. 
As for  the   industry breakdown,   it can  readily be  seen that manufacturing 
has experienced  the  biggest   increase  in American   investment over the 
past forty years,   increasing from approximately twenty-four percent 
(24%)   in  1929 to forty-one  percent   (41%)   in  1970   ($32.2  billion).31 
This   is  thus  solid support for the economists' contention that  inter- 
national  production   is  the main form of American multinational business; 
for the manufacturing component especially  requires  the  skills of  the 
American multinational  corporation. 32 
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TABLE   IV 
Growth of U.S.   Direct   Investments Abroad,   by Area and  Industry 
1929 -   1970 a/ 
Amount   in Billion 
Dollars 
1929        1950        1970£/ 
Percent  of 
Total 
1929      1950 1970£/ 
3.6 22.8 
4.6 14.7 
1.7 24.5* 
1.0 5.1 
0.9 11.0 
All Areas,  Total        7.5 11.8       78.1 
Canada        2.0 
Latin America     ....       3.5 
Europe        1.4 
Middle  East & Africa   .       0.1 
Other areas        0.5 
Developed Countries,Total. n.a. 
Less  Dev. Countries.Total. n.a. 
International.Unallocated. n.a. 
All   Industries,  Total.   .   .       7.5 
Mining and  Smelting.   .   . 1.2 1.1 6.1 
Petroleum  1.1 3.4       21.8 
Manufacturing  1.8 3.8       32.2 
Other  .'  3.4     3.5  17.9 
n.a. 53.1 
n.a. 21.4 
n.a. 3.6 
11.8 78.1 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
26.7 30.5 29.2 
46.7 39.0 18.8 
18.7 14.4 31.4 
1.3 8.5 6.5 
6.6 7.6 14.1 
n.a. n.a. 68.0 
n.a. n.a. 27.4 
n.a. n.a. 4.6 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
16.0 9.3 7.8 
14.7 28.8 27.9 
24.0 32.2 41.2 
45.3 29.7 23.0 
Notes:     Detail  may not add  to totals   because of   rounding, 
a/    Rook value at yearend 
p/    Provisional 
Excludes Eastern Europe 
n.a.     Not Available 
Source:     Survey of Current Business,   passim. 
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As  stated  above,   the more economically advanced  countries  of  the 
world have  received  the  biggest  percentage of  foreign direct   invest- 
ment over the  past  two decades,   rather  than  the  less-developed countries 
(LDC's).     However one  point must  be made   in connection with the  LDC's 
at this   juncture.     Although their significance  has  declined  over the 
past few years,33  there   is evidence  that  the   trend   is reversing  itself 
somewhat.     Professor Louis Turner states  that  there was a new burst of 
investment   in the LDC's  during  the   1960*s;3^   in this connection,   Pro- 
fessor Vernon has  given supporting evidence.     Noting that  the wide- 
spread   impression of the   role of the   lesser-developed  countries   in 
foreign  business  has essentially been one of  packaging and assembling, 
Professor  Vernon relates  that many foreign  investors  have gone  from 
this role to one of actual   production  in the countries.    This trend, 
as Professor Vernon further notes,   has mainly arisen due   to the  price 
(and cost)   benefits   that could be gained   in these countries.35 
U.   S.   subsidiaries   in Latin America alone,   he  later notes, ex- 
ported   $750 million worth of goods   in  1968,   more than forty percent 
(U0%)  of all  Latin American exports   in  that  year alone.36    Although an 
unstable  situation may exist   in many of  the  lesser-developed countries, 
these economists,  and others  as well,   realize  their future potential. 
In the   last decade  alone,   the  rate of  return on all   industries com- 
bined within the   lesser-developed countries has  averaged almost  twice 
that from the more developed countries—twenty-one   percent   (21%)  as 
compared  to approximately thirteen  percent   (12.6%).       Considerable 
benefits,   hence, may await those who   invest in  this "Third World," and, 
as  Professor Turner mentions,  many multinationals may have  to join the 
mainstream in order  to survive  in the  1970*s. 
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ConeludIng  Statements 
During   the  past  two decades,  the  net   investment  picture of the 
United  States  has almost doubled—from a rate of  $36.7 billion in  1950 
to $69.1 billion   in 1970;   this has mainly been because of an increase 
in U. S.  assets abroad,   from %54 billion  in 1950 to $167 billion in 
39 1970.   '     Probably the  largest  single factor accounting for all of this 
increase has  been that of   international   production as generated by the 
multinational  corporation.     However,   as this  phenomenon has  come to 
dominate much of   international   trade,  controversy has  begun  to surround 
it.    Due  to  its extreme  size and   large economics of  scale,  the multi- 
national  corporation has   begun to cause  some uneasiness among our do- 
mestic   labor unions  as well  as among foreign  governments.     Consider the 
facts  previously mentioned  as well  as these:     (1) According to Mr. Judd 
Polk, and  others,   U. S.  foreign direct  investment  by the multinational 
corporation has grown at a  rate of approximately ten percent   (10*)   per 
year since  the  1950's while  our own GNP has  only  increased at one-half 
that rate   (5%) "Standard" exports,   at this  same time,  have  experi- 
enced a  rate  of growth of  roughly seven percent   (7X>)   per year 41 (2) 
According to  Business Week,   in the   later  1960's, while the  profits of 
domestic corporations barely  inched  forward,  those by the multinationals 
42 rose more  than thirteen percent  (13%). (3)     Finally, even   though U. S. 
exports  have  continued  to grow during the  past  twenty years,  output 
associated with U.   S.  production abroad has   increased five  to six times 
43 
over this rate  of  "standard" exports. 
Thus,   in view of   these  facts,   the emergence of the multinational 
corporation upon the   international  economic  arena  in the  1970*s  be- 
comes clearly evident.     At the same  time,  one can  see  how uncertainty 
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towards this  phenomenon might  prevail among many  factions   in our 
society—notably organized   labor.     For, with an  increase   in inter- 
national   investment and  production,   there may be  a tendency,  as   labor 
has voiced,   for the firm to shut down   its domestic   plants, dismiss 
its American work  force,   and   invest overseas where the   labor standards 
and   (labor)  coats  are not as  high. 
Mr.  Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiber wrote   in  1968 that "Fifteen 
years from now  it   is quite possible   that the world's  third greatest  in- 
dustrial   power,   just after  the  United   States and Russia, will  not be 
Europe,   but American industry in Europe."'*'*    If this  becomes true,   if 
American overseas'   production does   become even more  prevalent in  the 
future,   then does  labor have  sufficient cause to worry? 
It will  thus  be the objective   of  this  thesis to explore the   impact 
of multinational   investments  abroad   on organized   labor and employment 
levels.    A subsidiary issue of  union strategy and union growth is   im- 
plicit  in this   realm and will  also be discissed   in this  thesis.     Spe- 
cific current  policy  issues  such as  those embodied   in the  pending 
Burke-Hartke   legislation will   be analyzed   in detail.     The concluding 
chapter will evaluate these   policy proposals and  attempt some modest 
proposals  of   its  own. 
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CHAPTER  II 
ORGANIZED  LABOR AS ANTAGONIST 
Introductory Statements 
From the early   1930's,  when  it  first  became  a force  to be  reckoned 
with, until the  middle   1960*s,   the  history of  organized  labor,   in re- 
gards to international   trade and   investment, was essentially one of 
liberality.    Knowing  that foreign trade was  not that   important to the 
United  States   (accounting for only five  percent of   total  U.  S. GNP), 
the   labor unions  often supported American efforts  towards free  trade. 
However,   in the  middle   1960's,   this  situation changed;  arguments  for 
protection from world competition began   to replace  those  for free  trade. 
Why did  this  happen? 
First of  all,   the  trade unions, after thirty years  of  solid growth, 
began to lose membership.1     From 1930 until   1956 union participation 
grew until   it reached   17.5 million,   or approximately twenty-five  percent 
(25%)  of the  total   labor force   in the  United States;  after  1956, decay 
began to set   in.     In the   latter   1960's, although roughly 18 million 
workers were  unionized,   they represented  only about twenty-two percent 
(22£)  of  the  total   labor force,   a three   percent decline  in just  twelve 
years.     The  reasons  for this decline were  probably many:     the growth of 
white-collar employment   in which union  organization was difficult,  the 
rise   in government employment,  the shift from goods-producing to service 
producing  industries, et cetera;   however  the decline was  readily evident 
and was  often a sore  point with many union   leaders.     From this   loss of 
membership,   due  to the  desire to protect what members were   left,   came  a 
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more militant  union attitude  towards   foreign   investment  by big busi- 
ness.     Secondly,   the  rise of the war-shattered economies   of Japan and 
Germany,  among others,  was clearly evident on the   trade  scene   by the 
early 1960's.     These economies,  as   the decade drew to a close,  would 
9 
greatly compete with the   United States  for world trade dominance. 
Thirdly,  another major development  that signaled   labor's   switch was  the 
emergence  of numerous   trading blocs,   the most notable  being the Euro- 
pean Common Market.3    finally,   for the first time,   the United  .States* 
balance  of   trade  position began  to worsen—dropping from an annual 
average  of  $5.4 billion  in the first half   of the  1960*s  to $2.6 billion 
for the  latter half.'*    Nevertheless,   these events,  although significant 
in themselves,  were   not enough to warrant   labor's  shift to protection- 
ism.    Overshadowing each—and  at  the  same   time   incurring  labor's   ire as 
the  main cause  of American  trade deterioration—was  one  major develop- 
ment,   international   investment  and production by D.  S. multinational 
corporations. 
Organized Labor's  1 rotectionist Arguments 
As the present decade begins, labor's position on the multinational 
corporation has been summarized by Mr. Nathaniel Goldfinger, Director of 
the AFL-CIO's  Department of Research,   in clear  terms: 
One of the  underlying causes   of the deterioration of the 
U.   3.   position   in world  trade   (at the  beginning of   1972 a de- 
ficit of $2.9 billion.5)   is   the  operations of U.  S.-based multi- 
national  companies, with far-flung foreign  subsidiaries,  patent 
und   licensing arrangements witn foreign companies,   joint venture 
deals and  other foreign arrangements...   l'he  operations  ot   U.  S.- 
based multinationals have exported American  technology, with the 
loss of  U.   3.   production and employment,   for  the   private advan- 
tage  of the firms.     J'hey are a major factor   in the rapid and 
substantial   loss of U.  S.   production   in such relatively sophisti- 
cated   goods as   radios,  televisions and  other electrical   products, 
as well  as   in  shoes and  apparel...     A   large  and  growing part  of 
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what   is  called U.   S.  exports and   imports  are  now transactions 
within the   structures  of  these multinational   firms—between 
the U.   S.-based company and   its foreign subsidiaries...     U.S. 
trade  patterns are  thereby affected  by the operations of the 
multinational...     The   0.  S.   government cannot much longer 
permit  the   private decisions  of multinationals  to determine 
the future  of the  American economy,  without regulations.6 
Labor in the  1970's,   is   thus   no longer a supporter of  the   law of com- 
parative advantage,  the  "classical"  basis for free  trade.     Submitting 
that the multinationals   not   only export employment and  technology,   but 
also marketing and management skills,  as well  as capital,  the  unions 
are calling for   protection.     At this  juncture one must ask,  how much 
employment opportunity,  due   to the  above,   is  being   lost?    How badly are 
capital  and  technology exports hurting organized  labor?    Before  these 
questions are  answered,   it  is necessary  to examine organized  labor's 
changed   position concerning  the classical concept of comparative advan- 
tage;   for  this new position   is at  the core  of union arguments  for pro- 
tection. 
Failure of Law of Comparative Advantage 
The classical  doctrine  of comparative advantage was   first   postu- 
lated by David Ricardo  in the  early nineteenth century—in his now 
famous   England-Portugal,   cloth-wine example.      According to this  doc- 
trine,  each country should  produce  those   goods which were  suitable to 
its  resource environment and  trade  for those   less-suitable.    This es- 
sentially meant  that countries   like  the United  States should  focus 
their  internal efforts on high-productivity products,  embodying vast 
amounts  of capital,   as well  as   technology and skill, and  trade  for 
those  products   in which great   quantities of  unskilled   labor were util- 
ized.     Only through this  method could world   income  be maximized. 
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Organized labor today,   however,  argues  that this doctrine  is  ob- 
solete   in view of   our highly technological,   fast-paced world.     Not 
only do products  tend  to move  internationally,   but also the  factors  of 
production as well, except for  labor,   thus contradicting the  assumptions 
a 
in this  classical  free   trade  concept.       Capital,   technology, and  manage- 
ment,  all  represented as   inter-plant  transfers  by the  multinational  corp- 
oration,  are extremely mobile   in  today's   international markets;   labor 
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is   not.       Hence,   the transfer of modern  technology can take place with 
almost  no time  lag at all,   so  that a corporation can   immediately send 
the most  highly-sophisticated  production facilities abroad  and  train 
the workers there  to utilize these  facilities  at  lower   labor costs  than 
in the United States.10    U.  3.   labor  (the only human resource in the 
economy),  on the other hand,   must  contend with job losses and unemploy- 
ment due to this outflow of capital and  technology.    Accustomed  to one 
certain region and  job,   labor  is not as  free  to relocate as  are  the 
other factors  mentioned. 
In short,   in the 1970's,   the unions contend there   is no stable, 
lasting basis  for comparative  advantage.    The   list of the top countries 
in trade   is constantly changing;   likewise,   the  factor  proportions  within 
many of   these  countries,   due   to the  influx of American capital and  tech- 
nology,   are  allowing them to effectively compete with the United States 
for world   trade dominance.    Such countries,  notably Japan and many of 
those   in Europe,   are,   at  the  same  time,   becoming more  and more  protection- 
ist,   following few of the  principles  found  in classical  free trade  philo- 
sophy.    All of  the above  has caused the  unions to reconsider their posi- 
tion on this classical Ricardian doctrine.    Reasoning that any free 
trade   policy  is   harmful   in light of today's shifting advantages,   or- 
ganized   labor itself  has become more   protectionist.    Also,   in changing 
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to this viewpoint,  union leaders  are contending that,  since  inter- 
national   production by the multinationals   is  merely an extension of 
domestic  production,   then those economic  principles applying to the 
domestic  firm are  more appropriate today than Ricardo's  basic  free 
trade doctrine.** 
Employment Opportunity Losses 
The main arguments,   as  seen   by the unions,  have thus been that 
capital and  technology transfers   have  played  an  increasing role   in the 
international arena, whereas wage and  labor transfers have not; conse- 
quents,  many American workers  have   lost   their   jobs, and countless more 
have   lost   their opportunity for employment.    Although relevant data   is 
virtually non-existent on the exact  impact that multinational  trade  has 
had  on U.   S.   workers   (primarily,   the unions say,   because  the  so-called 
foreign trade experts  have   been   indifferent to  labor's demands),   rough 
evaluations   have  been made.     Based   on U.   S.   Department of Labor data, 
it has been estimated  that approximately  1.8 million jobs   in   1966 would 
have  been needed   in the United States   in order to produce  seventy-four 
percent  (74%)   of  U.   S.   imports assumed  to  be competitive with domestic 
(U.  S.)-made products.     "In  1969,"   it  is  further  related,   "if we had 
attempted to produce domestically goods equivalent   in value to such 
12 imports...  we would have  needed  2.5 million additional workers..." 
Hence,  these  estimates   indicate that approximately 700,000  job oppor- 
tunities were   lost   in this   three  year period,   primarily because of  im- 
ports.    When  the statistics concerning the number of  jobs attributable 
to exports during this same  period,   roughly 200,000 are   presented,  a 
net   loss of   501,000  job opportunities  is evidenced.13     (Recently, 
these estimates have   been  updated   to approximately 900,000  jobs,   or 
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400,000 opportunities   lo?t   in the  last two years alone—1969-1971.)** 
Other approximations  have also been  forthcoming:     in  the electronics 
industry alone, which, coincidentally,   has   received  the heaviest number 
of union complaints concerning foreign direct   investment,15  £t ±a   re_ 
ported that employment has decreased   by 107,000 jobs  since   1966--roughly 
half  of which  (48,000)   have  been   in the consumer aspect of  the  industry, 
notably radios,   televisions,  and  household appliances. 
Why has  this   happened?    Why has  there been such a   reduction  in 
American chances  for employment?    The   unions  attribute this   loss  of em- 
ployment opportunities,   not solely to the   increase   in   imports alone, 
but   to the   increase   in American   foreign   investment,  especially direct 
investment   by the multinational  firms.     However,   thev then go even 
further.    Such firms,   union leaders claim,  are  not  interested   in  increas- 
ing American exports,   or even America's   position  in  trade;   they are  es- 
sentially "runaway corporations" which,   because of  lower unit costs  of 
labor abroad,   have   set  up production facilities  overseas.     These 
facilities   have   then been used  to export  the   finished   product   (or 
assembly)   in  the domestic market or competition with U.S.-produced 
goods   in the world  market. 
Although the   problem of "runaway"   plants has never been quantified, 
economists   relate   that   it  is a serious one, at   least  as  far as  the unions 
are concerned.17    Louis Turner notes that  between  1961 and   1968,  only 
3.5 million  jobs were created   in the United States,  despite  the Vietnam 
war and widespread   prosperity.18    Although his examples are  far less 
emotional  than those  of the unionists. Turner does admit  that the afore- 
mentioned  problem,   is   in part,   responsible  for this small   increase  in 
jobs,  and that  it is growing,   both   in America and  abroad.19    Robert 
d'A.   Shaw, with  the Overseas Development Council,   notes   that the movement 
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of  direct   investment that   has already occurred   (along with other factors 
in the economy)  has   left only twenty-six percent   (26%)  of  the U.  S. 
labor force   involved   in manufacturing,  as compared to thirty-five per- 
cent   (35%)   in  Britain and thirty-eight  percent   (38%)   in West Germany.'" 
(Manufacturing, as   is already known,  has been the main area of multi- 
national   investment  overseas;  at the   same   time,   it has  occupied   the 
premier position of   union membership  in the goods-producing  industries, 
with over fifty percent   (50%) of union workers concentrated  here. 
Future  international   production,  unions   fear,   may greatly decrease  jobs 
in  this area and,  hence, membership rolls.) 
World   Disparity  In Wages 
Closely related to the above problems,   the unions argue,  has also 
been the disparity of wage differentials  as seen in  the various countries 
in which American direct   investment has  taken place.     Employing data from 
the  Monthly Bulletin of  Statistics,   it   is  seen that  this disparity was 
extremely evident  in the  latter  1960's.     On a comparable hourly wage  rate 
scale   in manufacturing,   the   bulk of multinational  investment,  the values 
(in terras of U.  S.  dollars)   ranged  as  follows:     from $0.28   in Colombia, 
to $0.71   in   Italy,  to $0.76   in  France,   to $1.19   in West Germany,   to 
$2.22  in Canada.22     Data  from the U.  S.  Department of  Labor  for this 
same   period,   plus  1970,   shows much similarity;   1970 wages   in Italy - 
$0.9U,   France - $1.02, West Germany -   $1.58,  and Canada - $3.01,  had 
improved,  but the number of hours worked were much greater  than those 
in the United States.23    Robert d'A. Shaw,  utilizing data on  the ratio 
of  U.  S. hourly earnings  to those of various U.   S.  foreign affiliates, 
seems  to agree along  these same   lines;   in 1969,   he notes this ratio 
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was:    Mexico - 6.2:1, Taiwan - 9.8:1,   Korea  -  10.1:1,  and the  United 
Kingdom - 2.3:1.     However,   he also states that productivity differen- 
tials,  on a comparable  basis,  were  far  less.2**    finally, data from the 
II.  S.  Department of Labor on Mexico's  border  industrialization program, 
the major sore   point with many labor unions  today,   further illustrates 
this  problem.    Wages  here,   in 1970,  averaged  roughly $1.60  (II. S.   rates) 
per day for unskilled workers, with  the   semi-and  skilled workers  re- 
ceiving approximately $5.00  per day. Organized   labor  thus disagrees 
with many corporate   leaders*   notions  that  the  multinational firm will, 
in  the   long run,   be  an effective  device   for equalizing world-wide  wages. 
Elizabeth Jager  reports   that   these  same corporations  have   been unable 
to even equalize  their domestic wages   between Northern and Southern 
workers;   to do so among  their foreign affiliates may take  forever.*" 
With U. S.   unemployment   running well over five  percent  since   1970,   it 
would  seem that   labor's   concern,   in this   situation,   is not unwarranted. 
Capital And   Technology Outflows 
The  problem of   "runaway corporations,"  it   is  asserted, with a sub- 
sequent   loss  of U.  S. employment,   is  a major one with American unions 
today.     However,   job opportunities  have   not been the  only  item exported 
by these corporations;   overshadowing this  loss   of  job creation, have 
been   those  transfers  of  capital  and   technologically sophisticated   pro- 
ducts and  facilities.     (See Table V below.)    Table   V pictures the out- 
flow of U.   S.   capital abroad between  1960 and   1970.     In  1960,  capital 
outflows were  roughly $1.7 billion;   by  1970,  these had  risen to $t.U 
billion.    Also shown   in the  table   is  new direct   investment   (net capital 
outflows  plus  reinvested earnings)  between  these   same  years.     In 1960, 
this   investment, which gives a better   illustration of  the  true capital 
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TABLE  V 
U.  S. Direct  Investment Abroad 
Total, All   Industries 
All         Book                                 Reinvested    Capital Outflows      Total  Direct 
Areas       Value Earnings    Earnings Tota 1 Investment    Flows 
2,948 
2,653 
2,852 
3,483 
3,759 
5,010 
5,400 
4,735 
5,384 
5,858 
7,288 
1960 31,865 3,546 1,254 1,694 
1961 34,684 3,815 1,054 1,599 
1962 37,145 4,235 1,198 1,654 
1963 40,736 4,587 1,507 1,976 
1964 44,480 5,071 1,431 2,328 
196 5 49,474 5,460 1,542 3,468 
1966 54,799 5,702 1,739 3,661 
1967 59,491 6,034 1,598 3,137 
1968 64,983 7,022 2,175 3,209 
1969 71,061 8,123 2,604 3,254 
1970 78,090 8,733 2,885 4,403 
aSource:     U.   S. Department of  Commerce,  Bureau of   International 
Commerce, The  Multinational  Corporation:    Studies On IU S^ Foreign   In- 
vestment,   Vol.   I_ Trends   in Direct   Investments Abroad by IK ^ Multi- 
national Corporations  -   1960 to  1970  (Washington,   D. C:    Government 
Printing Office,   1972),   p.   33. 
For a breakdown of this investment between the developed and 
under-developed countries, see the source above (and its same page 
number). 
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outflow  picture,  totaled   $2.9 billion;   by  1970,   this  had  risen  to $7.3 
billion,   an  increase of one  hundred  and forty-seven percent   (147%)   in 
o 7 
just ten years." 
Capital  outflows   have also been evidenced  through the  commercial 
technology that  has  been  transferred abroad  by U.  S. multinational 
firms.    Statistics   indicating this   transferral   generally take  the form 
of  payments of  royalties and fees  to  the parent company by  the affili- 
ate;   thus,   no exact data can be  obtained covering the amounts of   tech- 
nologically related  facilities  that  have gone to each country.    Never- 
theless, .   it  has been estimated  that  technology abroad   increased  by 
eighty percent   (8(H)   between  1964 and   1969,   roughly amounting to be- 
9 Q 
tween $2  and   $6 billion,  depending on the source employed. Pay- 
ments of   royalties   and  fees during this   period  totaled   $2.5 billion, 
29 while management and  service  receipts amounted   to $3.9 billion. 
Total direct  investment   in the  past decade has  increased by over 
one  hundred and   forty-five  percent   (145%),   of which roughly seventy- 
five to eighty percent   (75-80%)   has  been accounted  for by the activi- 
10 ties of U.  S.  multinational  corporations. It   is   these  firms,   the 
unions assert,  that have been  responsible for the   increased  transfer of 
capital and  capital-related  technology,   mainly through  their   licensing 
and   joint venture  techniques.     However,  where  have these  transfers gone? 
Louis Turner states  that the   bulk of this   investment  has  gone to those 
industries  producing cars, computers,   pharmaceuticals,  electrical com- 
ponents,   chemicals, and  petroleum;   in short,  to those  highly technological 
industries   located mainly  in the developed  areas: 
In 1968 General Motors, Ford and Chrysler controlled 30% 
of the European car market; similarity American firms control 
2 5-30% of  the  petroleum market   in  the U.   K.   and   the Common 
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Market...   IBM manufactures around 65% of all   the computers 
sold   in  the  noncommunist world... The American lead   is  al- 
most as  serious   in crucial   fields such as  micro-electronics 
and   scientific   instruments.     One writer...  estimates that 
75% of Europe's  science-based   industries may be U.  S.-owned 
within 10 years.3* 
Another author,  Rainer  Hellmann,   relates that   in  the  latter  1960's,   the 
U.  S.  multinationals also controlled   "33% of  the petroleum refining 
capacity of the E.E.C....   (as well  as)   16% of  electronic  production... 
accounting for  50% of   industrial   semiconductor  production and   80% of 
32 electronic data  processing  related  production." 
However,  while a great   percentage  of U.  S.  direct   investment has 
occurred  here,   Europe  has not been the  only continent  invaded by the 
American multinational.    Canada,  as well as Mexico and the  Far East 
(two major underdeveloped areas),  have  also received their share of  tech- 
nological   investment.    As   is known, many electronics firms,  such as RCA, 
General   Electric,  Zenith, and Admiral,   have   transferred  their produc- 
tion to countries   like Japan, Taiwan,     Formosa, and Mexico.33    In Mexico 
alone,   it  is  reported   that approximately forty percent   (<*0%)  of the 
firms  there   produce electrical  components. In 1971,   it was expected 
that $350 million worth of   these components would  be exported back  to 
the United States.35    In Canada,  U.  S.   dominance  has  been quite exten- 
sive:    almost  ninety percent   (90%)   of her automotive   industry,  eighty 
percent   (81%)  of her electronics   industry,   and over sixty percent   (6U&) 
of   her chemical   industry are American-owned   today 
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balance of Trade Deterioration 
Up until this   point,   the  union argument  towards the   transfer of 
capital and technology has been relatively weak.     It can easily be seen 
that  increased capital  outflows have occurred;  also easily seen  is  the 
fact   that  there  has  been an  increase   in  technology diffusion throughout 
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the world.     Nevertheless,   how has the above   influenced employment  in 
the United   States?    The  union answer   is quite explicit.    Admitting that 
the  statistics   relating to the adverse effects  of capital and   techno- 
logy transferrals upon domestic employment are   rare,  union  leaders have 
looked to one major area for proof  that  these exportations   have  hurt— 
the weakening position of the United States concerning  the  balance of 
trade   (and   payments  as well). 
The United  States,   in relation to her merchandise  trade balance, 
had enjoyed  a considerable   surplus   (in   1960-1965,   averaging close to 
$5.4 billion annually)   until   the middle   1960's.     Export  growth during 
this   period  had averaged between seven and eight and  one-half   percent 
(7-8|%)   per year,  while   import  growth  had  risen  between three and   five 
percent   (3-57o).37    However,   beginning  in  1966,  exports,  although an  in- 
crease up to $35.5 billion by  1968  ($43 billion by  1970)  was seen,  only 
continued to rise  at   their seven percent   (7ft)   rate, while   imports   in- 
creased at  a far faster pace,   up to  $32.3 billion by 1968  ($40 billion 
by  1970)  for an increase of  from six  to twenty percent   (6-20&)   per year. 
The   trade surplus  during this  same  period dropped  to roughly $2.6 bil- 
lion   (later decreasing  to a deficit of 2.9 billion at the  beginning of 
this  year).     This  decline was especially evident   in the  following areas: 
(1)  the automotive   industry, after a surplus  of $1  billion  in  1965,   had 
a deficit  of   $2.3 billion  in  1970,   (2)   the non-foods consumer goods  in- 
dustry deteriorated  by more  than $3  billion,   from a deficit of $1.5 
billion  in  1965 to $4.8 billion in  1970,   (3)   the deficit   in   industrial 
supplies  rose  from $2.1  billion in   1965 to $3.2  billion  in  1970,   and 
finally   (4)   the  balance   in  foods and  beverages   switched  from a  surplus 
39 of   $1 billion  in  1965 to a   deficit of $0.3 billion   in   1970. 
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Thus,   the   latter  1960's were among  the worst  trading years   the 
United States   has ever experienced;  nevertheless,   the  trend continued 
on  into the early 1970's.     By 1971,  although the United States accounted 
for  nearly $200 billion  in trade,  our  share of the world market had 
dropped   to one-fifth   (with competition coming mainly from Japan and  the 
Common Market),  and  our trade deficit was  more than $2 billion.     Esti- 
mates are  that   these   trends will  continue,   reflecting,   in part,  the  tre- 
mendous   industrial growth in Western  Europe  and  Japan, as well  as  the 
speedup in economic  growth  in countries   like Taiwan and Mexico. 
What happened  to cause  this  deterioration  in trade?    Although many 
reasons  have  been given,'*1  union leaders essentially  picture  foreign  in- 
vestment  by American  multinational   firms as  the appropriate  reason for 
this  decline.     In  1964,  again viewing Table   V,  at the  height of  the 
trade  surplus,   annual   investment   flows  from U.  S.   firms were roughly 
$3.7 billion;   by   1970,  when this surplus was   rapidly heading towards a 
deficit,   this figure had  doubled  to approximately $7.3 billion.     New 
capital  transfers,  during this  same   period,   had also  increased  from $2.3 
billion in 1964  to $4.4 billion  in  1970, It must also be noted that, 
by 1970, sixty-one percent (614) of these transfers had gone to the de- 
veloped countries—the same ones competing with the United States today 
for world   trade  supremacy.**3 
At the  same  time,  while capital was  being transferred   abroad,   pri- 
marily by the  multinationals,   imports were  increasing  in the United 
States.     Examples   included the  following:     Imports of   rubber manufac- 
tures   increased   two hundred and sixty-six percent   (266%), while exports 
only  increased  twenty-seven rercent   (27*);   imports of clothing increased 
two hundred  and forty-four percent   (244%),  while exports   increased 
I 
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ninety-one percent (917.); and imports of textiles increased seventy- 
one percent (71%), while exports only increased twenty-three percent 
(23%). However,   not  only did  imports   increase  in  these   industries, 
but also   in many of   those   technologically-related  areas where American 
trade had been the  strongest.     In electronical apparatus,  as well  as 
transport machinery and equipment,   this   increase was  apparent:    "For 
example,  while exports  of autos,   trucks  and  parts  rose   138%,   imports 
shot up 884&,   exports  of  electrical  apparatus   rose   120% and   imports 
went up 447%.     Non-electric machinery showed  a  112% rise   in exports 
and  a 474% rise  in   imports." Finally,   from the Congressional Record, 
estimates   indicated that approximately twenty percent   (20%)  of auto- 
mobile sales,  thirty percent  of  television sets   (30%)with  forty-five 
percent   (45&)   of  black and white televisions  coming from the  Far 
East),       and  roughly sixty percent   (60%)   of sewing machines  and calcu- 
lating machines,   had been taken over by   imports. 
Capital   Expenditures  on Plants and  Equipment 
Capital expenditures  on  plants  and equipment abroad was another 
facet of   the multinationals'  actions  during these  years   in which our 
trade balance was declining.     (See Table  VI  below.)     In  1964,  again when 
the   trade surplus was  at   its  height,   plant and  equipment expenditures by 
the multinationals   totaled   $6.2  billion;   by the end of   1971, when the 
surplus  had vanished,   it was estimated  that these same expenditures would 
48 be $15.3 billion,  a doubling  in just  seven  years."*       (Manufacturing ex- 
penditures alone,   it  is  noted,   increased  from $3  billion  in  1964 to an 
estimated   $8.1   billion by  1971,  with concentrations  mainly  in the tech- 
nologically developed countries   of Europe and Japan.    This,  the Depart- 
ment  of Commerce  relates,  was  due  primarily to the  increase   in demand 
TABLE   VI 
Plant and    Equipment  Outlays 
of  Direct  Foreign  Investments   1960-70 
(billions of dollars) 
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1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Total $3.8 $4.1 $4.6 $5.1 $6.2 $7.4 
Mining & Smelting .1 .3 .4 .4 .5 .6 
Petroleum 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.3 
Manufacturing 1.* 1.8 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.9 
Other Industries .5 .5 .5 .5 .6 .7 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971* 
Total 58.6 $9.3 $9.4 S10.8 513.2 $15.3 
Mining & Smelting .8 .9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 
Petroleum 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.S 4.2 
Manufacturing 4.6 4.5 4.2 5.0 6.9 8.1 
Other  Industries .7 .8 .8 1.0 1.4 1.5 
a*Estimated 
bSource:     Various   issues  of Survey of  Current  Rusiness,   1960  to 1970 
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stimulated   by the  fast   "rowth  and  sophistication of   business  in  these 
countries.) Even accounting  for  inflation,   union   leaders  state,   this 
was a   huge   increase   in expenditures.     Another example   lends  further  im- 
portance:     the  balance  of payments  reported  by the Commerce  Department 
in  1970  showed   over $4 billion,   as  has been  stated,   in direct capital 
outflows while almost $8 billion was shown  in  returns  on this  invest- 
ment, mainly from dividends,   royalties and   fees.    However,   union   leaders 
note that capital  expenditures,  much of   it  financed by parent company 
reinvestment of   remitted   profits and depreciation allowances  of foreign 
affiliates,   totaled  $13.1  billion during this  same  period;   a deficit, 
not a surplus,   should  thus  have  been presented. (By viewing Tables 
V and  VI,   this  phenomenon can also be seen  for all  of   the  years  between 
1964  and   1970.) 
Export Outflows 
With  the  above trade deficit   in evidence,   the unions thus seem  to 
have  refuted   one of the main  premises  of  the multinational corporation-- 
that this   phenomenon has  greatly helped   both the   United States'   balance 
of  payments  and  balance of trade   positions.     Let us  first consider  this 
refutation by examining  the multinational  firm's effect  on exports.     From 
data collected   by the  Department   of Commerce   in  May,   1969,  some   interest- 
ing results are obtained. 
In 1965   (the   latest  year tor which  this data was available),   from 
interviews conducted with 330  U.  S.-based companies with over  3,500 
foreign branches,   it was  found  that approximately $8.5 billion   (or one- 
third of  the $24 billion that was exported  that year) was exported by 
II.  S. firms with foreign affiliates.51    Ot   this $8.5 billion,   roughly 
one-halt,  $4.4 billion,  was channeled directly through the toreign 
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affiliates  of  these  firms.    However,   this survey stresses that  this 
$k.k billion figure was mainly accounted  for by  19 of  the 330  firms 
(less   than six percent),  while   184 corporations  accounted  for only 
seven and   one-half   percent   (7.5%).     Further stressed  throughout  these 
interviews   is  the  fact that a  large number of  multinational affili- 
ates   bought nothing from their  parent company,   thus making no contri- 
bution to U.  S.  exports;   of the over 3,500 affiliates,   1,651 were   in 
this  group.    Also  related   is  the  fact that,   in  the manufacturing area 
alone,  fifty-seven  percent   (57%)  of   the  firms   interviewed  reported 
their affiliates  had no part   in distributing or selling abroad   goods 
purchased  from the   parent company.     Finally,   it  is estimated  that one- 
halt   ot  this   tk.i* billion,   $2.5 billion,  was sold abroad without further 
manufacture.     Of   this $2.5 billion,  nearly half was sold  by one   percent 
(1%)   of  the  affiliates, while  ninety percent   (90%)  had  no connection 
with any sales whatsoever. 
In  theory,  as  Elizabeth Jager  points out,  exports  from the  United 
States should  be   increased when American  production   is  set up abroad. 
Nevertheless,   the  studv above   found  the opposite  to be  true:    "The  great 
majority of U. S.   parent companies and  of   the foreign affiliates  con- 
tributed very little   to export  trade,"   the  study noted.     "This suggests 
that foreign direct   investments   by U.   S.   corporations do not necessarily 
contribute to the export trade  of   these corporations."    Or, as  Mrs. 
Jager relates,   to increasing the export  trade of   the United States.52 
(Here,   union  leaders  point out  that  such would  be  the case since most 
exports   by the multinationals are only  interplant   transfers anyway.) 
Export  Displacement 
In actuality,   the unions assert,   the  actions of the multinationals 
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have not only been negligible concerning U.  S.  export trade;   they have, 
in fact,   served  to displace American exports.     Foreign  investment has 
essentially been undertaken because  the  lower wages abroad  have  promised 
higher profit  margins  at  home;  capital  and  technology have   been ex- 
ported   in order to realize  these profit margins.     Lower exports,   in many 
technologically productive areas,   as   the  previously mentioned figures 
have  shown,   have  been the   result.    Extensive studies on export dis- 
placement  in manufacturing   (during  the early 1960*s)   by G. C. Hufbauer 
and F.   M. Adler have  proven the above  to be somewhat  true.     Employing 
three assumptions   in their study (classical,   reverse classical, and 
anticlassical),       these men have obtained   interesting results.     Under 
reverse  classical  assumptions   (in which U.  S.   investment substitutes   for 
native   investment   in the  host country),  Hufbauer and Adler  have  found 
that American exports were   increased somewhat   in Canada,  Latin America, 
and Europe,   but not elsewhere.     However,   more  damaging results have  oc- 
curred when the other two assumptions were  used.     Under classical  or 
anticlassical  assumptions   (ooth of which relate that U. S.   direct   in- 
vestment   increases  net capital  formation   in the host country),  U.  S. 
exports  have  been greatly displaced   in both Canada and   the  "Rest of   the 
World"   (Third World),  moderately displaced   in Latin America, and  some- 
what displaced   in Europe.    This displacement  of exports  by  international 
production is   thus a serious  problem,  the unions contend, and should  not 
be taken   lightly.    Yet  the problem becomes even more  serious when  it   is 
viewed   in relationship to the   increase  in   imports  that have   occurred   in 
the United States during the  past few years—and more  importantly,   the 
increase   in  imports   that has   occurred  from American affiliates overseas. 
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Import  Penetration 
Estimates  from the U.   S.  Department of  Commerce  have   long shown 
that   imports   of   petroleum and  mining products  have  been regularly 
shipped from American affiliates  to the   parent  company,  citing the much 
higher production costs  here as well  as  the need for these raw material 
products. Union  leaders,   however,  are not worried  about such   imports; 
for  these   imports  have always  been a  facet  of American trade.     What   is 
of concern to them  is  the  present trend of  an increasing percentage  of 
affiliate-manufactured  products   that  have  begun to be   imported  back to 
the  United  States.     In  1965,  U.  S.   purchases  from their manufacturing 
affiliates abroad amounted to approximately $1.8 billion,  or  roughly 
eight  percent   (3.3 4) of   total  U.  S.   imports and  four  percent   (4ft)  of 
total affiliate  sales.     Yet  by 1968,   the   last year for which such 
figures are available,   these   purchases   had   increased to roughly $4.7 
billion,  or approximately fourteen and one-half   percent   (14.3%)  of 
total U.  S.   imports and eight percent   (8i?>)   of  total affiliate  sales—a 
growth of  over one  hundred and  sixty percent   (160%)   in   just  three  years. 
What   is of even more concern  is the  fact that, although manufacturing 
imports from those   facilities   in the  underdeveloped countries  have  been 
small,   investment here has   increased  over two hundred  percent   (200%)   in 
the  last decade,   posing a definite challenge  for the  future.     In this 
connection,   figures   from those countries  under Tariff  Schedule  807,   both 
developing and  developed alike,   have proven  quite   interesting. 
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Tariff   Provision  807 
Tariff Schedule 807, introduced in 1963 with the adoption of new 
schedules, was originally designed to provide for "duty-free entry of 
American products  returned  to the United  States if  they had  not been 
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•advanced   in value  or   improved   in condition  by any process   of manufac- 
ture or other means.'"     (In other words,   the  good was  permitted  free 
access to the American market   if  the only value added   to  it was the 
labor that had  produced   it.)58    Its sponsor,   Victor A.  Knox, R-Michigan, 
proved himself a  poor  prophet  by then forecasting:     "I  believe  there  is 
no possibility that  these  particular products would ever be  shipped   to 
such countries as  Belgium,  Spain,  Portugal,   and so forth,  because  of 
high transportation costs   .   .   ."3      Since   its   inception,   this schedule 
has   not only been used   by the developing countries   to export  components 
back to  the United States,   but also by the  developed  ones as well;   here 
again,  the   influence of  the  multinational  corporation may be  seen,   for 
it   is   in  these  same  countries   that much of   the  U.   S.  direct   investment 
has  occurred.     Statistics from the Department  of Commerce show that, 
primarily,   11 countries   have  accounted for approximately eighty-eight 
percent   (88«)  of  the   total  value of I).  S.   imports  coming   in under  TSUS 
807;   these   include  West  Jermany,  Canada,  Japan,  Britain,  and  Belgium, 
as well as  Mexico and Taiwan.60    Mexico,   the   largest re-exporter of 
electrical  components  to the   United States,   has been an extreme sore 
point with the AFL-CIO.     With a  twelve and one-half mile duty-free  zone 
since   1965,  Mexico has   increased   its   imports  tremendously under TSUS 
807,   from $3.1 million   in 1965 to  roughly $145 million  in  1969 alone 
(rising  to between $350-500 million  in  the early 1970*s).    At the same 
time,   the number of  D.   S.-owned  plants  there   has   increased   from 30  to 
250   (or up 300,   depending on  the source employed),  while  the number of 
workers,  as  has  been previously mentioned,  has   risen from 4,000  to 
40.000.61    This   increase,   the  unions  relate,  has  been at  the cost of 
thousands  of U. S.   jobs. 
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It must  also be   stated  that   the growth  in   imports  under TSUS  807 
(which totaled  $2 billion  in  1970, with the developing countries ac- 
counting for  roughly $U00 million of   this)62 has not been  restricted 
solely to the  few labor-intensive   industries  seen in the  developing 
countries,   but  has  likewise  occurred   in those capital-intensive   indus- 
tries   in the developed   ones  as well.     Products   imported  under  this 
schedule,   from all countries,  have   included   the  following:     motor 
vehicles,   aircraft,   tractors, and   gas-powered engines from the more de- 
veloped countries, with electronic memories,   radio apparatus,   scienti- 
fic   instruments,  and televisions  coming from the   lesser-developed ones.63 
Another  interesting fact  is  that,  while  overall   imports  have grown tre- 
mendously the  past  five  years   (averaging approximately thirty-four per- 
cent - 34% - between 1967-69 alone),   imports  under TSUS  807  have grown 
even faster   (averaging roughly seventy-seven   percent  -   77£ - during 
this  same   time  span).     Moreover,   these   imports   have  resulted  in  huge 
savings  to the  companies   involved,   increasing from $24 million  in  1968 
to roughly $30 million   in  1969.64 
Imports entering the United  States  under TSUS  807,  as well as other 
schedules,   have also presented  the   unions with another major problem— 
that of parts or components   being assembled abroad and shipped  back  to 
the   Unites  for  sale under the American "brand" name.     (In this connec- 
tion,  the unions'  argument  that all  multinational exports  are merely in- 
terplant  transfers,   later to be used  for domestic production, may seem 
well-founded.    This contention becomes even stronger when Department of 
Commerce data  relates  that approximately one-quarter - 25% - of all   U.  S.- 
manufactured exports  go to the foreign affiliates  of the multinationals  - 
$5 billion annually - some of which may be   Inter re-exported.) 65 
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Again,   though no extensive data   is  available  to verify this  assertion, 
there  are numerous examples:     "The  Dodge  Colt," one source  states,   "one 
of   the  new American   'answers'   to the small car   imports,   is   100  percent 
made-in-Japan,   by Mitsubishi.     If   you buy  Ford's  Pinto,  another of  the 
U. S.   industry's  answers,   you may get a car with an English-made engine 
and German-made  transmission,  assembled either  in Canada or the United 
States." However,   the  auto  industry has not  been the   only one  to 
practice  this   policy.     Brand-name   imports   in the  consumer  products*  as- 
pect of   the electronics   industry have also been evident.     In   1970, 
these   included  the following:     sales of five million home radios,   1.73 
million  televisions,   400,000  phonographs,  and  1.3 million tape  recorders. 
Consumers,   the   International   Union of Electrical Workers   reports, did 
not  benefit  from these   imports  for sales,   instead  of  rising,   continued 
to fall.67 
Other Losses 
Harder  to judge  have  been the  overall  effects of the  multinational 
corporation on  the  U,   S.   balance  of   payments.     Although  no exact figures 
concerning this   impact are available,   several  studies have  been made, 
the  results of which are  somewhat   imprecise.     Professor Jack Behrman, 
of  the University of North Carolina,  has estimated   that,   in a balance 
of  payments sense,   income  from direct   investment  usually has paid  for 
itself within two years;  after which time benefits were usually noted. 
However,   in econometric  studies by C.  C. Hufbauer and   F. M. Adler,  as 
well as W.  B.  Reddaway,   this  time span has   been severely  increased. 
Using a static model  embodying  the  three assumptions previously stated, 
Hufbauer and Adler  have  found that  the  average  recoupment  period  for 
American direct   investment has  been approximately nine  years; 
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Professor Reddaway of Cambridge University has  found  that  this period 
has been roughly IU years. Again,  although data concerning this as- 
pect of trade   is  unavailable and  these estimates are   inexact,  they 
spell  trouble  for domestic American workers who see   jobs,  as well as 
job opportunities,   lost each  year with no net discernible   benefits on 
the American  balance  of   payments,  until after much time. 
Protectionist ^Argument8  Summarized 
Labor's argument toward  this  economic concept,  as the   1970's  un- 
fold,   is  thus   based   on world trade;  more  importantly,   on the multi- 
national  corporation's   influence concerning world trade.     Realizing 
that   trade, as   it  is now known,   only makes  up approximately five  per- 
cent   (5W   of   total   U.  S. G.N.P.,   the unions  point out that  it  is   in this 
area that   the multinational  firms'   impact has been the greatest.     Re- 
acting to criticism towards   its  new stand  on protectionism,  organized 
labor argues that the  times  have  changed.     No longer can world trade  be 
viewed  in  the  classical  sense,  merely as an exchange of  goods;  the 
multinational  corporation,   in replacing world trade with world produc- 
tion   (a   fact not reflected   in  trade statistics),   has changed all  of 
this.    As   this   has changed, so has  organized   labor's views.     The unions 
today are  essentially worried   about the  trends   in world   trade and   invest- 
ment,   both  past  and  present.     Union leaders are uneasy about the  fact 
that direct  investment abroad   has   increased   from $12 billion  in 1950 to 
$78 billion  in this  decade.     They are even more uneasy about  the   loss of 
thousands  of   job opportunities  that have occurred   in the wake of  this 
new investment, especially   in the declining goods-producing   industries 
in which manufacturing dominates and where most  union membership has 
taken place. 
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The unions  have witnessed many extraordinary events   in the past 
decade.    They have seen capital outflows more   than double   (rising by 
one hundred and forty-seven percent -  1U7& - since   1960).    They have 
likewise   viewed an eighty percent   (80%)   increase  in technology; all of 
this going mainly to those lower-wage  developed   (as well  as under- 
developed)  countries which have  risen to compete with the   U.  S.  domina- 
tion of world  trade.     The unions have also seen the  results  of such 
outflows--a dampening  in  the export growth of such main technological 
areas as chemicals and electrical and non-electrical machinery which 
have,   in  the  past,  made up one-third of all  U.   S. exports)71   plus a 
tremendous   increase   in   imports  from the aforementioned  countries,  not 
only  in the   low-technology areas,   but also  in the higher ranges  as well. 
The cost  of  all   of   this  for  labor; at   the  same  time as our  balance of 
trade has  declined,   due  to these   imports,   the unions  have witnessed even 
greater increases  in  investment,   greater reductions   in the  domestic 
work-force,   and a  rising number of  giant corporations  going overseas  to 
produce.    As   they look   into the  future,  union leaders can only believe 
this will   increase. 
Such trends  are recent to union beliefs; as a consequence,   the 
threats   imposed   by these  "runaway" multinationals are  still   relatively 
new to union strategists.     However,  even  though they are new,  there   is 
evidence that such trends are growing  (witness  the   increase   in manu- 
facturing affiliates abroad,   as  presented  earlier,   as well as  the  ex- 
portation of goods  back to the  United   States).     "It  is now quite common," 
as Louis Turner  states,  "for multinational   managements  to  stress to un- 
cooperative union leaders  that continuing  (domestic)   troubles will  mean 
locating further  investment  in another country where a more docile 
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labour force will welcome  the extra  work."'"    Moreover,   in this connec- 
tion,   the  unions are  faced with an even greater problem--for if   they 
strike to halt  this   investment,   there   is  the chance  that   the  firm can 
import output from  its overseas'  affiliates.     One example  to  illustrate 
this  fact   is described   by Turner: 
Charles Levinson of  the international  Chemical Workers 
tells  of  Goodyear, which  has   plants   in the U.  S.,  Sweden 
and West Germany.    Around   1966,   the Swedish subsidiary stock- 
piled   in anticipation of a strike   in  the  U.  S.,   but was  per- 
suaded  that  the  strikebreaking attempt was not worth the 
company's  trouble.    A year  later,   the same stockpile was a 
threat  to union strategy  in Germany.73 
Examples such as  this understandably worry the  trade unions, and  unless 
measures are  taken,  their  leaders  reason,   the end of  certain labor- 
intensive   industries   in the United  States  may  soon be evident. 
Remedies  -   Burke-Hartke Act 
Although no well-developed   statistics can be  generated  concerning 
the multinationals'   impact  on U.  S.  employment,   the unionists  argue  that 
such facts are  unwarranted.     Events   being what  they are,  union  leaders 
reason,   that,  by the  time such figures are  produced,   international   pro- 
duction will   be  too well-entrenched  to be dislodged.    Action must  be 
taken now.     With this   in mind,  union  leaders,   together with two major 
politicians,   have derived  one  of  the  most  protectionist  trade   bills ever 
presented   to Congress—this bill,   the   Foreign Trade and   Investment Act 
of  1972   (the  Burke-Hartke Act).    Among its more stringent provisions 
are  the following:7"     (1) Title  I - Tax procedures would  be set up to 
make D. S.  corporations'  overseas operations more closely conform to 
their domestic operations   (in  1968 alone, many corporations  received a 
$2.3 billion credit from the  Internal   Revenue),75 where,   in the  past, 
44 
foreign  investment has   increased  sixty percent   (60%)   faster  than do- 
mestic  investment.    This provision would end  the practice of allowing 
most multinationals  to credit their foreign  taxes against the  tax bill 
owed  to Uncle Sam (now a  100% savings  to many corporations);   instead, 
such taxes would now be deducted  from  the corporations'   taxable   income 
(only a 48% savings).     (2)  Title  III  -  Provisions  to establish a 
"siiding-door" concept for   imports would   be   instigated.     Import quotas 
on the basis  of   those that entered  between  1963-1969,   the worst years 
in our balance  of   trade, would be  set up;   this,   in effect, would  stop 
the wide-open door on   imports now seen, while   those   imports admitted 
would   be guaranteed a certain annual  percentage   (not mentioned)  of 
U.  S.   production.     In addition,   those goods not  produced here   (bananas, 
for example)  or those goods  already under  legislated  quotas would  be 
exempted  from the above.    Likewise,   in  succeeding years,  the number of 
imported units would   rise or fall   in relation to the  number of  units 
produced   in the  United  States.     (3) Title VI - Devices  to regulate  the 
flow of capital  and  technology (the  unions*  major  problems) would be 
instituted.     Finally, Title VII - Provisions to  identify foreign-made 
components  for use   in American brand-name  products would be established. 
Here,   consumers would have a stake,   for they would not  be fooled   into 
paying an American price  for a car or radio whose  parts  had  been 
assembled  overseas.     Also, a   repeat of TSUS 806.30 and  807 would  be 
evidenced,   thus  preventing all U.  S. firms  from re-exporting home any 
products assembled  in the countries   presently under these  schedules. 
Concluding Statements 
Union leaders,   in  judging this act,  essentially agree   that  the 
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bill's  restraints  on imports,  as well  as those on the outflows of 
capital and   technology,  are  deliberately tailored  to meet  today's 
changing world.    Ten years ago the cry of "free  trade" was consistent 
with union believes;  however,   times   have changed.    The  tremendous   in- 
creases   in capital-related  outflows to  the developed countries,   together 
with the  resultant   increases   in   imports  from such countries,   have meant 
the  loss  of  countless   job opportunities  for American workers.    With the 
repeated occurrence of   these tendencies,   labor has become more protec- 
tionist;   the above-mentioned bill   is   the  primary exafiple of  this  senti- 
ment.     Free   trade   today essentially means keeping  the  II.  S.   market wide 
open for the  foreign affiliates  of  the American multinational corpora- 
tion.    This   is a reality that organized   labor will not stand   for. 
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CHAPTER   III 
THE  MULTINATIONAL  CORPORATION AS  PROTAGONIST 
Introductory Statements 
The  history of  multinational  trade   is probably as  old as the  history 
of the world   itself.    Among the major economic forces  throughout the 
centuries,   this  phenomenon has appeared  numerous times   in the   inter- 
national  arena—examples   include the East  India Company,  the Massachu- 
setts Bay Colony,  and  the ventures  into Asia and Africa.     However,   it 
has  only been   in the   twentieth century that  this concept  has come  to 
dominate   international trade and   investment;   synonymous with this domin- 
ance   has   been the   rise of American "big" business with  its  huge corporate 
structure. 
In  the   last fifty years,   due to the efforts of such entrepreneurs 
as J.   P. Morgan,   Henry Ford,  John  D.  Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie, 
American  business   has   been organized   into highly efficient corporations, 
whose gross  profits  have come to rival,   quite  often,  the GNP's of entire 
nation-states.    As  the structures  of  these corporations  have   increased 
in size,   their  influence  has  become more and more  prevalent,   both in 
domestic and foreign affairs.    As a result of this   influence,  the major 
economic  development   in this century has  been  the American multinational 
corporation;   through this one development corporatism and  trade have  be- 
come analogous   in   international economic affairs. 
The American multinational corporation has originated changes  in 
essentially two major areas.    As can be seen from Table  IV shown 
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previously,  there  has been a noticeable   increase   in the activities of 
manufacturing multinationals   (reflecting the   impact   of the above entre- 
preneurs),   in contrast  to   the more   gradual   increase   in the  petroleum, 
as  well as   the  other raw materials,   multinationals.     Consistent with 
this   increase  has been the  shift   in  investment concentration from Latin 
America to both Europe and   Canada.    This   table also  illustrates,  quite 
conclusively,   the change   that has occurred   in the  nature of multi- 
national   business  over the   past fifty years.    As  Louis Turner states: 
The  typical  multinational company in the  past was a 
primary producer   (petroleum,   bananas,  coffee, meat, 
cocoa,  etc.) which had to  invest abroad because  that 
was  the source of   its basic  products.    These were 
multinational  because  their supplies and markets were 
in different nations;   they were   thus forced  to co- 
ordinate   production, markets  and  transport on an 
international   basis.1 
However,  the  multinational of  the   1970*s   is   less  tied   to any one  in- 
vestment or  location,   preferring to invest where the market  growth,  and 
thus  profits,   is   the  greatest.2    This   has been mainly brought about 
through the  technological advances  that  have occurred   in transportation 
and communications.3    Where   the  tycoon of forty years ago,   in order to 
view his   investment,   had  to  take a voyage of approximately six days 
across  the  ocean,   he now has  only to travel   in a   jet  roughly six hours; 
where  forty years  ago,   primitive telephone and  postal   links  hampered 
communications with his overseas manager,   today there  are  international 
telephone  services and communications  satellites,  so that he may speak 
to this man   in a matter of minutes.    Not  only have   personal   transporta- 
tion and communications services   improved,  freight services  have also 
witnessed  rapid   innovations.     Overseas manufacturing plants,   from which 
spare   parts  can be easily flown, are but one consequence of   such  inno- 
vations.** 
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The above  rise   in American multinational  corporatism,   together with 
the  rise   in overseas direct  investment by this  same   phenomenon,  has 
generated  much  in the way of controversy during the   past decade.     Center- 
ing  in this  controversy have  been the demands  by organized  labor that 
this   phenomenon has essentially  led   to a  decrease   in American employment 
opportunities as well as   to a deterioration  in the  U.  S.   balance of 
trade.    Corporate  leaders,   in  return,   have denied such charges.    The 
multinational corporation,  these men have contended,   has  not advanced 
unemployment   in the United  States.    On the contrary,   this concept,   to 
these corporate   leaders,   through  its  freeing of world capital and  tech- 
nology,   has helped  to  increase employment   in the  United  States,  as well 
as contributing  positively,  to our balance of trade.    Likewise,   in 
further  reply to  the  unions' assertions, direct overseas   investment has 
not taken place  solely  in response  to  the  lower   labor costs abroad,   but, 
in the main,   has  occurred  because  of various  other factors. 
Relevant statistical data,   as   is  known,   has related  how much  in- 
vestment has occurred  and where   this has gone;   however,  such figure* have 
not reported   the why.     Why has  this   investment taken place?    Why have the 
corporate   leaders   invested where  they did?    How has   this   investment 
helped domestic  employment?    It   is necessarv to examine   these questions 
before continuing. 
Rationale  For Direct  Investment Overseas 
Follow The Competition 
Numerous   reasons  have been given by corporate   leaders for their  in- 
vestment decisions abroad;  however, most can  be  placed within certain 
categories.    The  first such category,  usually defensive   in nature,  can 
5* 
be defined as the desire to "tollow the competition" or to maintain "our 
share of the market." Conclusive studies by the Harvard Graduate School 
of Business suggest that, although most U. S. firms would rather operate 
here they must invest abroad in order not to lose their overseas market 
to competitive foreign firms, usually in Japan or Europe. To such 
studies,  many businessmen have  readily concurred. 
Evidence, especially  in Europe and  Canada,  suggests  that the above 
reason  is not entirely without merit.     Europe has   long been a continent 
conducive  to rapid multinational growth.     With the formation of   the EEC 
in the 1960's,  an extremely flexible environment within which to  invest, 
especially  in regards  to trade and antitrust barriers, was created. 
Consequently,  the  United  States,   along with the other  powers   (notably 
Japan), has  undertaken such  investment here.     Prom statistics already 
quoted  in Chapter  II,   it  is easy to see  that  this  investment has been 
extensive,   permeating much of Europe's automotive,  electronical, and 
petroleum markets. 
Canada, with an economy extremely dependent  on trade, has also been 
another haven for foreign  investment;   in the   latter  1960's,  nearly one 
hundred  percent   (100%)   of   her manufacturing industry, and  sixty-four 
percent  (64%)  of her oil   industry were  foreign-owned.7    At  the  same 
time,  of her  743   largest corporations,   380 were  foreign-controlled; 
among these   largest,   351 were   in manufacturing,  of which 221 were  foreign- 
owned.8    American  investment here,   as has  also been noted   in Chapter II. 
has accounted for much of  the above ownership;   in this connection,   total 
U. S.   investment   in Canada,   in the  1960's,   generally ranged between 
thirty and   thirty-five  percent  (30-35%),   the highest percentage   for any 
one country during this   period. 
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It would   thus  seem that,   to remain competitive   in the  1960's,  U.   S. 
corporations had   to   invest overseas.     Further support  for this  conten- 
tion can be obtained   from the  most extensive  survey of the multinational 
corporation to date.     In  the summer of  1971, members   of the  Harvard  Univ- 
ersity Graduate  School  of Business began an   investigation of  this  phen- 
omenon   (the  results of which will   be   presented   later)  and   its  relation 
to  international  business.     In deriving a  framework within which to 
study this  concept,  they utilized a  relatively new approach—the product 
life cycle.*"    Fomulated  by Professor Raymond Vernon,   this hypothesis 
is  relatively simple   in design.    The United States'  market,  because of 
its   lar»e   population and  high per capita   income among consumers,   is, 
more  often  than any other country,  quite aware of new product  innova- 
tions.    Consequently,   it   is  the world's   largest market  for such  products, 
due  to the  freedom possessed   by 0.   S.   producers  to change  their   inputs, 
and  to the   rapid  communications between   themselves,   their suppliers,  and 
the consumer.     As   the   product   is developed   by these men,  close contact 
is maintained with the U.   S.  market.    As a result,  these manufacturers 
thus  originally locate  one hundred   percent  (10(H)   of their firms within 
U.  S.  borders, exporting their  product overseas. 
Later,  as the product matures and  some standardization   is seen,  pro- 
duction begins   in the other major  industrial  nations.    At  this   point, 
U.  S.  manufacturers, sensing a threat to their export trade from these 
lower-cost  foreign competitors, may begin to locate outside   the United 
States.     Production to meet  foreign demand   (especially evident   if  the 
product  has a high   income elasticity of demand  or   is a  substitute  for 
labor), will  now be filled from the  host market,   instead of  being ex- 
ported.    As   this   procedure  becomes more   pronounced,   other U.  S.   producers. 
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seeing their competitive  position,  their  "share of  the market"  imperiled, 
may  begin to follow this  "pathfinder."    As a result,   high-income and 
labor-saving devices,   formerly exclusive  factors   to the  United States, 
are now exported, with a  resultant decline   in  the  I). S. export trade and 
its  share   of   the world market.     However,   one  point must be made at this 
juncture:     regardless of whether the United States   is  the  first  to pro- 
duce  outside   its   borders,   its  share  of   the world  market would still de- 
cline,  as  foreign firms,   utilising diffused American  technology,  would 
begin competitive  production. 
Late   in the  product cycle,   as  production becomes more standardized, 
cost considerations  more   important, and competition keener,   the   lesser- 
developed  nations,  with their   low-cost   labor,  may begin to play a   part 
in production.     At any rate,   it must be concluded  that the U.   S. manu- 
facturers must   invest abroad,   in order to retain their market.    Although 
this hypothesis deliberately simplifies   reality,   there  is considerable 
evidence that much of U.   S.  manufacturing abroad  does originate   in  the 
above   terms.** 
Freedom  From American Trade  Barriers 
Another major category accounting for this   increase   in overseas 
investment   is  the  desire   by many firms   to escape U.   S.   trade and anti- 
trust  barriers.     Tariffs  and quotas,  as can easily be  seen   in any 
economics   textbook,   are  essentially deviations  from free  trade.     Designed 
for numerous   reasons,   these devices mainly redistribute   income,   raise  pro- 
duction costs,   and   hurt the consumer.     However,  even though the United 
States  has called   herself a free  trade nation,  the  history of American 
trade has  been one of   these numerous  restrictions.     From the early 1800's, 
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through the McKinley Tariff of  1890   (the  peak of  pre-World   War I 
tariffs),  to the   Fordney-McCumber and Stnoot-Hawley Tariffs of  the   1920's 
and  30's,  devices   restraining  free  trade  have  been many.12    Moreover, 
even with the  Kennedy-Round   agreements and  the formation of GATT   in the 
1960's,  such  restrictions are  still  prevalent   today.     Statistical evi- 
1 \ dence  from the State Department supports   this  assertion. 
In an unpublished  analysis  by John Renner,   head  of  the State De- 
partment's   international   trade section,   it  is stated  that  the average 
tariff  rate on  industrial goods  in the  United  States   is roughly eight 
percent   (8%); whereas,   in the Common Market,  Japan and Canada,  these 
figures are approximately eight and one-half  percent   (8.tt%), eleven per- 
cent   (10.9*),  and eleven  percent   (11%),   respectively.     However, as Renner 
notes,   the United   States  levies  tariffs  of  twenty percent   (20%)  on more 
than  60 of  the   919 most  frequently traded   industrial   products.    This 
levy   is much higher than those   seen for any of  the other countries 
trading  in these goods.     Japan,   for example,   levies  this tariff  per- 
centage on only 26 of these  same predicts.    Also,  our  use of   import 
quotas has   increased;   since  1963,  Japan has done away with   71 quotas 
(with another 20  to have  been gone  by the   beginning of this  year), and 
the EEC has deleted   11;   the  United  States,   on  the other hand,  has added 
60 during this  same  period.     Finally,  U.   S.  quotas now cover approxi- 
mately seventeen percent   (17%)   of   total   industrial  imports;   in Japan and 
the EEC,  only twelve   percent   (12«  and  four percent   (4%), respectively, 
are covered by such quotas.    Although Renner admits that these figures 
cannot   be  taken at  face value,   there   is enough evidence here   to establish 
the  importance of   tariffs and  quotas on U.  S.  trade. 
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Antitrust  Escape 
Antitrust   legislation has also created barriers  through which the 
multinationals  have  tried   to escape.     U.  S.  antitrust  laws,  expressed   in 
both the Sherman and  Clayton Acts,  are founded  on the  principle  that com- 
petition  is  necessary for the health of the economy;   thus, any acts, 
mergers, or combinations   to restrain this competition by creating mono- 
polies,  or oligopolies,   are   illegal.     European  law,   on  the other hand, 
encourages  such combinations or mergers;   dominance of any industry by 
one or two firms   is   not considered   illegal.    Likewise,  European govern- 
ments,  especially those   in the Common Market,   consider these concentra- 
tions of   industries   to be beneficial   if they serve to increase   produc- 
tivity,  advance economic  growth through technological   inflows,  and re- 
duce  prices.li*    Hence,  two definite contradictions exist:     on the one 
hand,   V.   S.  courts constantly seek to block any industrial mergers 
threatening competition;   on the other,  European   industries   (and   those   in 
other countries  as well)   are actively encouraged by the courts  to engage 
in cartel arrangements.     U. S.  corporate   leaders are not unwilling to 
take advantage of  the gains  from overseas antitrust   (or  lack of  it); 
consequently,   much movement has  taken place   in order to maximize  such 
?ains.    As   this movement  has occurred,   U,  S.  courts have  become   in- 
creasingly   interested   in the affairs  of these multinationals   (as  they 
relate to domestic commerce),  especially those   of   the   joint venture 
nature;  however,  at this writing,  no controversial  cases   have  been 
prosecuted.15     In the future,  antitrust may be   relegated  to a lesser 
role   in  international   affairs as  the multinationals   increase   in numbers 
(thus  reducing  the concept  of a dominating  industry),  as  they spread 
into more  national markets,   hence freeing trade,  and as  these national 
59 
markets expand,   permitting more domestic  growth. 
Host Countries* Growth Potential 
16 
The growth potential  of  various  host countries  has also been a 
factor   in American overseas  investment.    As can easily be  seen from 
Table   IV shown earlier,  American investment abroad,  at  the  beginning of 
this century,  was mainly confined  to the  raw materials countries of Latin 
America;  however,   by the 1940's  and  50's  this picture  had begun to 
change.17    Europe and Japan,  after World War  II,   began  to build  them- 
selves   (mainly with II.   S.   aid  and technology)   into effectively competing 
countries.     Operating behind   tariff  protection,   usin>; lower cost  labor, 
and effectively employing American technological advances,   these coun- 
tries  soon  presented  a well-developed   threat   to American dominance  in 
international economics.     This  threat manifested   itself even more  in 
1959,  with the   implementation of  the Common Market.     Hence,   in the 
1960's,   in response  to this threat and   partially due  to an   increased 
demand   in Europe for even more American   technology,   investment  began  to 
switch  to here—as shown   in Table   IV.    As a result,  the  U. S.  share  of 
the European market,  enjoying the  gains  from reduced   internal  tariffs 
as well as   less  stringent antitrust laws,   is firmly entrenched  in Europe 
today,   having exported  over $2<+.5 billion worth of capital  to many of 
her countries by 1970. 
However,  the growth  potential   possessed by the  lesser-developed 
countries  has not  been neglected.     Although most  of American  investment, 
in the  past,   has gone to Canada and Europe,   there are signs   today of an 
increased  interest by the multinational  corporation towards  the   lesser- 
developed  countries.18    Though only seventeen percent   (17S)  of  the $32 
billion  book value of American manufacturing  investment  in  1970 was com- 
! 
60 
mitted   to the "Third World,"  there countries did account for a larger 
proportion of  total  book value   in the  other  industry categories;   notably 
petroleum—forty-six percent   (46%),  and mining and  smelting—forty per- 
19 cent   {1*0%). Likewise,  the   rate  of   return on   investments here was sub- 
stantially higher,   throughout  the  1960'B,   than the same   rate  for  the 
developed  countries   (twenty-one   percent - 21% - as compared  to  twelve 
and one-half  percent -   12.6%).20    The multinationals have,   in the past, 
been reluctant to invest   in  the "Third World"  for  fear their investment 
would  be   lost;  nevertheless,   the benefits from locating here,   from low 
labor costs  to  little host  pressure,   may be   indicative of  the  future 
growth potential   to be  found   in   these countries. 
Other Reasons 
Numerous other reasons have  also been advanced to explain the  in- 
crease   in American multinational   investment;  among them are:     a desire 
to  produce   in the  host market   instead of exporting to it,   lower produc- 
tion costs,   and a need  to diversify  product   lines  to avoid  fluctuations 
in earnings.21    All,   however,  can be seen to fit within the previously- 
mentioned classifications.    Likewise,   these  same classifications,   though 
diverse  in origin,  seem to have  one common thread:     in each, the  tested 
ability of the large American corporation to survive  in the world market 
is clearly evident.    As Dr.  Virgil Salera relates,  this  type of  firm has 
learned  from experience how to spot the  best domestic market with the 
least costs, where  to place   its  specialized  production facilities,  and 
how to solve the  problems  of communications and  transportation. 
Dr.  Salera further notes: 
It (the firm) has probably operated in New England, the 
Midwest, the South and the Far West and it has mastered 
the challenges of   industrial   logistics.     The difficulties 
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and problems of recruiting and training labor have 
largely been solved. . . . Research and development 
on both the product and production fronts are pur- 
sued with imagination. . . . The firm has acquired 
sophistication in the management of short-term and 
long-term finance, employing diverse t inane ial in- 
struments." 
In short,   this  corporation has survived  in the   largest,  most com- 
plicated  market   in  the world.    Logically,   the next  step for the firm, 
assuming exportation  has been proceeding for some  time,   is   to engage   in 
world competition.     With such engagement,   seen through   international  pro- 
duction  in the world markets,  the  firm can  thus  realize   its  optimal 
growth  potential. 
Impact of Multinational   Investment 
The American multinationals   that  have   invested overseas  have   thus 
mastered  this  technique  of survival.    Attaining the  forefront in domestic 
management and  production,   these  firms have   then transferred   their skills 
to foreign markets.     However, much controversy has  resulted  from these 
transferrals;   union leaders have  pictured  such corporations  as "runaways" 
taking with  them American employment,   capital and   technology.    Have  such 
corporations   transferred employment?    Have  their exportations of  capital 
and   technology hurt American  job opportunities?    In other words,  have 
these corporations defied   the Ricardian  law of comparative advantage, 
the  very basis  for the  free  trade actions their managements advocate? 
On this,  opinions are  varied. 2U 
Comparative Advantage  Issue 
Critics  of the multinational  corporation,  and of  free   trade  in 
general,   have essentially maintained  that  this  phenomenon has violated 
the major assumptions  in Ricardo's   law:     that only commodities can move 
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internationally, while  productive  factors cannot.     In violating this 
assumption,  the critics argue,  the multinational  corporation has exported 
capital,  management skills,  and  technology,   all of which are classified 
as factors of  production.     As a consequence,   the  stablp,   lasting charac- 
teristics of  product movement under  this classical   law have been changed; 
hence,   the   law  itself   is  no longer applicable  to today's  fast-moving 
markets and   rapidly advancing technologies.    As  this  has   become more 
apparent,  most  critics have  become  protectionist   in order to offset   the 
impact of  these   imperfectly flexible  multinationals,   thus  allowing the 
U.  S.  economy to adapt to the changing advantages created by them. 
Proponents  of free  trade,  notably the multinationals,  while  not 
denying that comparative advantages have been altered since Ricardo's 
time,  assert that this law is  still  applicable  to trade.25    Likewise, 
they believe   that our economy can adjust  to any changing advantages 
created  by the multinationals  (without  restrictions),   thus assuring the 
stability of  this classical  doctrine.     Inherent   in this  belief   is  the 
ability of the economy to adapt to the declining merchandise  trade  bal- 
ance,  most  often cited   by the critics as   the reason for their protec- 
tionist attitude.    This  decline,   proponents assert,   is only a normal   re- 
action to the  above changing advantages,  whereby our exports of merchan- 
dise  have been  replaced  by net exports  of capital,   management skills, 
and  technology.     In fact,  many free  traders are   predicting a persistent 
decline   in this  trade  balance;  however, any increase   in the outflows of 
capital and technology will essentially be supplanted by an increase   in 
the dividends and  royalties associated with these  outflows,   thus main- 
26 taining overall  equilibrium. 
In answer to critic's claims  that  protection  is needed   in order to 
allow the economy to adapt  to these changing advantages,  proponents 
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argue   that such  protection would  mainly reduce this adaptability.     By 
shielding domestic  producers from all   foreign competition,  any restric- 
tions would only diminish domestic  production,   reduce many technological 
advances   introduced  overseas,  and  hurt the American consumer.27    More- 
over,   proponents   point out  that comparative advantages even within U.   S. 
industries are constantly modified  by changes   in style,   tastes,   tech- 
nology,  or  location;   however,   protectionists do not want  restrictions 
placed  on these domestic trade   industries or on the capital and labor 
that migrate to such  industries.28 
In short,   proponents argue  that  the doctrine of comparative advan- 
tage   is still the main basis  for  trade   today.    Once  thought to be stable 
and  long-lasting,   the concept,  advocates will admit,  has  been modified  by 
recent outflows  of capital  and  technology,  thereby  raising the human 
costs of  both specialization and   labor's ability to adjust.     Critics 
have maintained  such costs are  too high;  hence, Ricardo's doctrine  is 
no  longer applicable.    This,  advocates  argue,   is untrue;  Ricardo's 
basic concept,  though somewhat changed,   still   provides for the optimal 
allocation of world  resources and  maximization of world welfare.     In 
other words,   the  benefits from all  unrestricted  investment and free 
trade still  outweigh,  as   they did   in the early 1800's,   the costs. 
Employment  Issue 
If  the  benefits  from free  trade and   investment, as advocates of  the 
multinational corporation contend,  do outweigh the costs,  then domestic 
employment should eventually be   increased as a result of such   investment. 
In this connection,   however,  much disagreement has  been witnessed.     Union 
leaders have esti«ated that roughly 500,000 domestic  job opportunities 
6* 
were  lost  between 1966-1969  (with another 400,000 between  1969-1971), 
the same  years  for which  imports  made their greatest gains   in U.  S. 
markets.    These   losses,  they have  further stated, were mainly due to 
overseas   investment  by "runaway"  multinational corporations.    Trade pro- 
ponents have strongly disagreed with this estimate.    George Hildebrand, 
former Undersecretary of Labor,   holds  that  these  supposed   job losses 
were only "phantom jobs," not even  representing employable   persons. 
The  years   1966-1969,   he notes, were  years of full employment   (unemploy- 
ment at approximately 4%,  with which this writer agrees);  hence,  most 
American workers  had   jobs.     The only way these   500,000 workers  could 
have been put to  producing the equivalent of any imports that entered 
the United States during these  years would  have been to divert them from 
2 9 their  jobs.*       Since full employment was evident, Mr. Hildebrand notes, 
this  did not happen. 
Support  for the above assertion has come from essentially two areas. 
According to recent  information from the Department of Labor,  a compre- 
hensive study, covering roughly 190  industries   (in which most of America's 
manufacturing is  found) ,  has  been made  to try to match employment with 
any import changes  that  occurred during 1966-1969.30    In the course of 
this study,   it has been found  that,  during this period,  only 37 out  of 
the 190  industries suffered any net employment decline;  moreover,  only 
26  industries out of this  37  had any rising level   of   imports to speak of. 
Finally,   the   total  number of   jobs   lost during this  period,   in the 26  in- 
dustries,  was   117,000,   approximately one-half  percent  (1/2*)  of total 
manufacturing employment   in 1969—where 2 million new jobs  had been 
created.    The  study concluded  that   imports were not the sole  reason jobs 
were  lost during these years;  declining productivity and demand  in these 
65 
industries also played   their  part. 
An  input-output analysis  of  trade  and employment between 1970 and 
1971   provides   further  reliance  for   the above: 
Using Bureau of   the Census   trade  data and  Bureau of Labor 
statistics   input-output  technical  coefficients   ...  Lawrence 
Krause  and  John Mathieson   (two major trade economists)  have 
found  that   16,600  jobs were   lost  because of  shifts   in   im- 
ports and  exports   between the first quarter of   1970 and 
that  for 1971.     With a   jump   in unemployment  of over  1.5 
million persons   in the  same   period,   the  estimated  direct 
contribution of   international  trade  to IJ. S.  unemployment 
was barely  l*.31 
Upon further reading,  one discovers  that   increased   imports cost  134,000 
jobs  in such American   industries as  steel,   motor vehicles,   textiles, et 
cetera,  during  this  period, while exports  created   181,400  jobs  in the 
same   period.32 
If  the proponents  of  free  trade are correct,  as the above suggests, 
then the   impact  of  the multinational   corporation on U.  S.  unemployment, 
during the  years  of greatest   import   penetration, was not significant. 
However,   did the multinationals,  through trade,   significantly  increase 
employment during this  same   period?    For  the  answer,   an examination of 
this   phenomenon's   impact on capital   flows,   technology,  and  overall 
balance  of  trade must  be  made. 
Repatriation of Capital 
Critics of   the multinational corporation have often emphasized   the 
increased   outflows  of capital   that were evident during the   years  in which 
imports were the  greatest   in the United  States.     Indeed,  such  increased 
outflows did occur.     In  1960,  as has already been evidenced,  capital  out- 
flows were   roughly  $1.7 billion;  by 1970 these   had  risen to  $4.4 billion. 
Moreover,   in 1960,   new direct   investment   (capital outflows plus re- 
invested earnings) amounted  to $2.9 billion;  by 1970  this had  risen to 
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$7.3 billion.     Finally,   in   1960,   the   book value  of all direct investment 
was  $32 billion;   by 1970  this  had  increased  to $78 billion   (reflecting 
the   increased capital outflows  to an even greater extent). 
Proponents  admit that  such outflows are  stated as negative items   in 
the  U. S.   balance of   payments;   nevertheless,  corporate heads, unlike 
their critics,  are quick to point out that  the   income repatriated to the 
United States   in the form of royalties, fees,   interest, and dividends 
exceeded such outflows regularly in the  1960*s,   representing a  positive 
reflection on  these  same balance of   payments.3*     in  1960 such income was 
approximately $3 billion:   by 1970 this  had   increased  to roughly $8 bil- 
lion   (see Table   VII below).     Moreover,   total earnings  on all  direct  in- 
vestment  increased by $62.3  billion over  this decade   ($3.5 billion in 
1960 to $8.7  billion   in  1970);   at   the  same   time,  total   income on such 
investment   (the earnings  above minus  the  reinvestment of funds)   in- 
creased by $57.2  billion.     (Total direct   investment outflow for the 
decade, on  the  other hand,  was  roughly $49 billion;  thus,  a net positive 
balance of   $7 billion was  seen.)31*    Likewise,  the  1960's yield on this 
investment was,   roughly,   thirteen percent   (12.6«, an extremely generous 
return.35     (It must be noted here that,   although the  rate of  return on 
direct   investment   in the   lesser-developed  countries was higher than that 
for  the more  developed  ones;   this was   primarily due to the structure of 
petroleum affiliates   in the  former.    The yield on manufacturing affili- 
ates--^—was  approximately  the  same   in all countries.) Lastly, 
another $6  billion  in patents,   licenses and  other services was also re- 
patriated to the United  States during this decade.37    Thus,   from the 
above,   it can easily be seen that such outflows have generated much in 
the way of   positive returns on the U.  S.  balance  of payments, a  key 
institution  in American trade. 
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TABLE   VII 
Receipts  of  Income on IJ.  S. Direct Investmrnt Abroad 
(mil)ions   of  dollars) 
Fees and 
Interest,  Di 
and 
vidends 
Year Royalties Branch Ear nings Total 
1960 590 2,355 2,954 
1961 662 2,768 3,430 
1962 800 3,044 3,844 
1963 890 3,129 4,019 
1964 1,013 3,6/4 4,687 
1965 1,199 3,963 5,162 
1966 1,329 4,045 5,374 
1967 1,438 4,518 5,956 
1968 1,546 4,973 6,519 
1969 1,682 5,658 7,340 
1970 1,880 6,026 7,906 
Source: Survey of Current Business,   June, 1971,   p.  32. 
68 
Technology  Issue 
Technology  transferral  has  also been a source of contention between 
the multinational corporation and  its critics.     Studies have   long shown 
there exists a  relationship between research and development and a 
country's export   position.     In this connection,   as   long as a country can 
maintain a   lead   (gap)  over   its   foreign competitors   in the higher-range 
technological  products,   its   balance  of trade   (and  payments)   position 
should  be enhanced.     Union leaders today assert,  however,   that tech- 
nology transfers  by the multinationals have   resulted   in the closing of 
this "technological gap," citing the   1960's   import   increases  in the 
higher technological   ranges.    As a consequence   of this closing, America's 
competitive advantage  has declined   in world trade, due to combinations of 
this   technology with  low-cost foreign labor.    With such contentions, Dr. 
Richard Borecsky,   of  the Department of Commerce,  would seem to agree.38 
After a thorough   investigation of development   (R & D)   trends,     Dr. 
Boretsky concludes  that, for the past several years,  the  United States 
has  been losing   its  technological   leadership in the higher-range  products. 
He attributes  this  loss to a  number of factors, among them:     the   in- 
creased ability of foreign firms to adopt "old  technology"—and,  at   the 
same  time,  new  innovations,   and the slower  increases   in productivity by 
0. S.  firms.     If   this continues,   it   is  stated, America can only face a 
worsening balance of  payments  position. 
Proponents agree that much technology has been transferred abroad 
by the multinationals; however, for a number of reasons, they disagree 
with the critics as to the results of this transferral. First of all, 
the technological "gap" of the past, it is noted, has only been one of 
management.39    As  Europe employs more Americans   (which she has done   in 
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the  past), as well  as further  training her own workers,  one can expect 
this  gap to close.     Secondly,   any foreign  subsidiary will  permit  the 
continued exploitation of American technology lone; beyond the  time  of 
its   beneficial  usefulness,   simply because   it will  probably be  the most 
established firm  in the   host country.     Due  to the  large siie of   its 
parent,   this subsidiary will  have built  up the economies of  scale nec- 
essary to maintain such a  leadership rule.    Thirdly,  even though our 
balance of  trade has  declined,   U.  S.  exports  of  those   products  in the 
high-technological  areas,   including chemicals,   computers, and aircraft, 
still   show a surplus;   again, although foreign competition for world   trade 
dominance has   increased with the United States,   dependence on any new in- 
novations  created here still exists.40    Finally,  proponents  do admit that 
foreign labor,   in those countries  receiving most of our technology,   has 
been cheaper relative  to U. S.  wages;  nevertheless,  these countries have 
made  tremendous  strides   in wage  parity.ul    Consequently, with such strides 
the   traditional   idea of   low-cost  foreign  labor has begun to lose  much of 
its  significance. 
Advocates of the multinational  corporation do admit that much tech- 
nology has   been transferred overseas;   nevertheless, corporate   leaders 
are   quick to point out  that much   in  the way of balance of  payments' aid 
has  been gained  from this  tranaferral.    At all   times  between   1960 and 
1970,   receipts  of royalties and  fees  from affiliated   (multinational) 
firms  were much greater   than  those from non-affiliated   foreign firms. 
These receipts  amounted  to $13 billion  in  1970,  compared to $<* billion 
from the non-affiliated firms.     (Such receipts,   it must  also be stated, 
were  almost thirty-two percent -  3236 - of all   investment returns from 
our foreign subsidiaries.)"2    Moreover,  total  receipts   (from all  firm.) 
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were  far greater,   in the  same period,   than any payments which had to be 
made  to these  firms   ($17  billion compared  to $1.6 billion).**3    Hence, 
while outflows  of technology may have   indeed   been a  factor   in  the rela- 
tive decline of U.  S.  exports   in the   1960's,   receipts  from such  invest- 
ments exerted a  far more   position   impact  on our balance of payments   (and 
thus  trade).     The bulk of  such receipts,   it must  be  restated,   came from 
Europe.    Thus,  even as  she closed this  technology "gap," European de- 
pendence  upon new U.  S.   innovations   still  existed. 
Direct capital  and  technology-related capital  outflows  have greatly 
increased  since the middle   1960's;   the multinational  corporation,   it  has 
been asserted,  has been  the  principal  vehicle  for such outflows.    At  the 
same time,   critics have  stated,  our balance  of  trade has greatly de- 
creased,   imports have   permeated   the American market, and many employment 
opportunities  have  been   lost.    Has   the multinational, as  these critics 
relate,   been  the principal agent for  the above?    For this answer, an over- 
all view of our  balance of   trade must be made. 
Balance  of Trade 
The  latter  1960's were  probably the worst  trading years   in U. S. 
history.     Exports, which had helped to generate a trade  surplus averag- 
ing approximately $5.4 billion annually,  fell  off  to around  seven percent 
(7%), while   imports  began to   increase   greatly, averaging between six to 
twenty percent   (6-201);   the   result was a decrease   in our surplus  to 
roughly $2.6 billion   (with a deficit of  $2.9 billion to be  later evi- 
denced).    Union  leaders, witnessing  increased outflows of capital and 
technology at  this same  time,  blamed  the multinationals for this decline. 
However,   these men neglected   one major aspect of macro-economic policy: 
when a country  is at full employment   (as the United  States was  during 
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the middle   1960's)  and  prices, costs,   incomes, et cetera,  begin to rise 
(again the  picture here at this time),   then  the demand Cor  imports   is 
likely to become stronger. 
Inflation 
Of the numerous  reasons which accounted   for  the huge  increases  in 
imports during the  latter 1960's,   inflation was probably the  one most 
often mentioned.     As   the   Federal  Reserve Hank of St. Louis explained  in 
1968,   "The disappearance  of what had come to be considered our tradi- 
tional area of  strength  in  the balance of  payments   is due almost entirely 
to    domestic   inflation."'*'*    Department of Commerce data  for  the   1960's 
essentially agreed with  the  above   statements.     In analyzing  the data,   it 
was stated   that   the  inflationary factor existing   in the United States 
during this   period overshadowed all  others   in stimulating the   increase 
in   import growth.     Indeed,   imports   in  1968 (increasing at a rate of 
23.6% over  1967)  alone were   $5.2 billion larger than they would have been 
if  the eight and  one-half   percent   (8.3.4)   import growth rate of  1962-6** 
had   remained   in effect.tt5 
In a special   1969 report  to the President on U. S.  foreign trade 
policy,   further support   is  given to the above.    From a committee con- 
sisting of corporate   leaders  as well as  union heads   (George Meany and  I. 
W.   Abel   included),  attention was directed towards   inflation as being the 
primary cause  of   import   increases   in the   latter 1960's.     Indeed,   imports 
had even helped,   somewhat,   to  reduce  the   rapidly-rising prices during 
this   period.    The committee  related   that, when economic  growth   is normal, 
imports  usually tend to decrease;  this contention was explained by Paul 
McCracken,   then head of the Council   of Economic Advisors: 
For  the  U.   S. economy   imports tend  to grow at about the 
same  percentage   rate  as GNP  if the  latter  is growing 
~T 
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about   5-6 percent   per year.     When GNP begins to race ahead 
more  rapidly,  the  rise   in   imports quickly starts  to become 
close to 2  percent   for each  1   percent rise   in the  domestic 
economy.     This   is   to be expected.    When the  domestic eco- 
nomy becomes overheated,  delivery schedules at  home stretch 
out,  and   increasingly demand spills  over to  foreign markets.**6 
In connection with  this  idea,   the  committee noted that GNP,   for ex- 
ample,   increased  by an average of eight and one-half  percent  (8.4%) dur- 
ing 1965-66;   imports,  at  the same  time,  averaged   increases  of sixteen 
and one-half   percent   (16.5%).    The  same pattern was  repeated   in both 
1967 and  1968.**7    Until efforts were employed  to reduce  these   inflation- 
ary trends,   the  committee  argued,   imports would continue to  inundate  the 
American market.     (This   inflationary argument,   business men say,   probably 
accounts  for much of the   trade deficit   in  1970-71,  also.) 
Thus, when  business activity  increases,   incomes   become higher, and 
costs  rise   (one of which  is  labor—for strikes were often  prevalent during 
the  latter  1960's),   inflation is apt  to occur,  and with it,   imports.    As 
this  phenomenon  increases,  any trade surplus   is   likely to fall.     Final 
support  for this assertion   is gained  from a recent econometric study of 
world trade  by two economists, Gerald Adams and  Helen Junz.    Realizing 
that  inflation and full employment  represented   the main U.  S. economic 
picture   in the   latter 1960's,  these economists  likewise noticed  that 
other major countries, notably Germany  (1966-67), Japan  (1965-66),  and 
France and   Belgium (1964-68), were having slack periods of  growth during 
this time.     (These same  countries,   it must be  stated,  were among those 
whose exports  to the United  States   increased during this period.)     If 
these major  industrial economies had  maintained  full employment during 
these  years,  Adams  and Junz  noted,   the  0.  S.   trade balance would have 
been  improved  by more   than   $5 billion annually. 
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Union critics,   in nonacceptance  of the  above  argument,   have  pointed 
to five major ways  in which multinational   investment has  accounted  for 
the decline   in our balance of   trade,  with the  subsequent   loss of American 
jobs,  over the   past seven years.    These are as   follows:     increased  capi- 
tal  and   technology outflows,   the  rise   in expenditures  on  plants and equip- 
ment,  the   increase   in   imports  from multinational   foreign affiliates,  the 
rise   in  imports  under TSUS 807,  and  the  reduction  in U.  S.-based exports 
from all multinational  firms. 
Internal Affiliate Reinvestment 
Corporate dissent,   it must  be noted,  on all capital and   technology 
outflows  has already been evidenced;   likewise,  disagreement  may also be 
seen in relationship to all  plant and equipment expenditures   by U. S. 
multinationals.     Capital expenditures on  plants  and equipment  by multi- 
national affiliates,  businessmen agree,   increased  greatly between  1964- 
1970   (from $6.2 billion to an estimated $15.3 billion);  however,   in 
response  to union critics,  such expenditures were  not  financed entirely 
by the  parent company,   but came   instead  from internal  sources within the 
affiliates themselves.     (In 1965,   I).  S.   sources—retained earnings,   divi- 
dends,  et cetera—had  accounted  for twenty-four percent - 2U% - of af- 
filiate expenditure  funds;   by 1968,   this had been reduced to  fifteen per- 
cent   15%.)*'     In this connection,   it must be noted   that  one major event, 
which probably reduced  this dependence on U.  S.  sources,   occurred   in 
1968 through the   institution of OFDI controls.    With these controls   in 
evidence,   affiliates were  forced  to increase their practice of  borrowing 
from foreign  banks   in order to finance their expenditures on  plants and 
equipment.50     (Estimates on the amount of borrowing,  at  the  present,   have 
varied   from $1   to $2 billion,  and,   as  this   practice  increases   in the 
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future,  such borrowing could   become a negative   item on the  U. S.  balance 
of  payments.    To determine  this,   however, would  be extre-nely complex and 
far beyond  the scope  of  this   thesis.)     Hence,  as   the 1960's ended,  most 
of   thf-se expenditures were  be in 3 financed  from sources  outside the United 
States; moreover,  even with the   capital  limitations   imposed   by strict 
OFDI  controls,   affiliates were  able  to  increase their earnings  remit- 
tances  to the  parent company   (thus  helping our balance of payments) 
through foreign  borrowing. 51 
Imports 
A third major area  of union contention has been the   increase   in 
imports from multinational-owned  affiliates,   most of which,   it is  claimed, 
have   resulted  from the  outflows  of direct  investment.     As a consequence 
of such outflows,  union leaders  have  become   increasingly worried over the 
rise   in affiliate-manufactured  products  that   have entered the American 
market   (rising from 8i in 1965 to 14.3% in  1968).    Again, to this asser- 
tion,   corporate   leaders  disagree.     According   to the U. S.  Department of 
Commerce,   sales  by multinational   affiliates   in  1968  (the  last year for 
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which such data   is available)   totaled   $59.7 billion  (see Table VIII). 
Of  these sales, most were  made   in the market where  the affiliate was 
located, with Canada receiving  the   largest amount,   followed by Great 
Britain.     In this regard,   local sales,   it  is noted,  accounted for seventy- 
eight  percent   (78M  of  the   total,   with fourteen percent  (14S)  exported to 
other countries,   and only eight  percent   (S«,   a small  amount,   going to 
the  United  States.     (Such trends,   it   is  further stated,  occurred   in the 
earlier 1960's,   as can also be  seen  from Table  VIII.) 
The union uneasiness towards U.  S.-affiliate manufacturing imports, 
corporate   leaders argue,   has also  been  largely unfounded and  can be 
TABLE  VIII 
Sales of  Foreign Manufacturing Affiliates, 
By Area,   Industry and Destination,   1965,   1967,   1968 
(■illions of dollars) 
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Total Sales Local  Sales 
1965 1967 1968 1965 1967 1968 
All areas 42,317 53,151 59,676 34,686 44,994 46,465 
Food  products 4,015 5,098 5,366 3,482 4,423 4,593 
Paper 1,803 2,172 2,534 944 1,192 1,420 
Cheaicals 6,881 8,857 10,215 5,799 7,401 8,497 
Rubber Products 1,710 1,978 2,126 1,569 1,801 1,948 
Primary ft fab.  metals 3,091 4,049 4,666 2,331 2,969 3,437 
Machinery excl. elec. 5,364 7,384 8,192 4,158 5,406 6,165 
Elec. machinery 3,992 4,752 5,298 3,516 4,186 4,655 
Transport equip. 10,745 12,850 14,522 8,975 9,756 10,402 
Other  products 4,716 6,011 6,757 3,912 4,860 5,348 
Canada 13,349 16,585 18,548 10,890 12,361 13,369 
Latin America 5,526 7,128 7,966 5,111 6,458 7,213 
Europe 18,685 23,080 25,835 14,264 17,408 19,195 
Common Market 9,850 12,002 13,921 7,517 8,858 10,042 
Other,   incl.  U.K • 8,835 11,078 11,914 6,747 8,550 9,153 
Other areas 4,757 6,358 7,327 4,421 5,767 6,688 
Exported  to Exported to 
United  States Other Countries 
1965 1967 1968 1965 1967 1968 
All areas 1,789 3,688 4,741 5,842 7,469 8,470 
Food  products 119 187 211 414 488 562 
Paper 
Chemicals 
643 697 745 216 283 369 
171 172 189 911 1,284 1,529 
Rubber  products 7 29 30 134 148 148 
Primary & fab. metals 183 340 398 577 740 831 
Machinery,  excl. 
Elec.  machinery 
elec. 167 250 338 1,039 1,728 1,689 
59 62 90 417 504 553 
Transport equip. 
Other  products 
278 1,744 2,485 1,492 1,350 1,635 
162 207 255 642 944 1,154 
Canada 1,380 2,956 3,787 1,079 1,268 1,392 
Latin America 101 161 212 314 
509 541 
Europe 
Common Market 
231 394 549 4,190 5,278 6,091 
100 191 305 2,233 2,953 3,574 
Other,   incl.   U.K. 131 203 244 
1,957 2,325 2,517 
Other areas 77 177 193 
259 414 446 
Source:     Survr y of Current Business, October  1970 
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easily explained.53    Before   1965, American cars shipped   to Canada were 
subject  to a  seventeen and  one-half percent   (171/24)   import duty;   in 
that   year,  however,  an automotive pact was signed  between the  United 
States  and Canada,   in which all  such duties were eliminated.    The result, 
commerce experts explain, was a tremendous   increase   in transportation 
equipment   Imports,  accounting for the  six percent   (6$)   increase  (to 14.370) 
in total manufacturing imports.     Excluding this equipment   (mainly auto- 
motive)   imported   from Canadian affiliates,  only about eight percent   (8%) 
of  total U.  S.   imports came  from foreign manufacturing affiliates   In 
1968,   approximately the  same  percentage  as   in  1965, Thus, no major 
increase whatsoever occurred   in this area. 
Tariff Provision 807 
Neither has  the American market been excessively "swamped," as union 
critics contend,   by  imports entering under Tar ift   Schedule  807.    TSUS  807 
has   long been a sore  point with organized   labor;   to these men this  law 
essentially allows  the multinationals to take advantage of  lower-cost 
foreign  labor   in  their production,  thus harming American workers.    Presi- 
dent Nixon   in   1969,   in response   to this  union alarm, ordered an   investi- 
gation of  this schedule  by the U.  S. Tariff Commission  in order  to deter- 
mine   its effects  on employment opportunities and wage levels  in the United 
States.    Allowing for uncertainties,  the Commission concluded  that any 
repeal  of TSUS  806.30 or 807 would not only not   increase   job opportunities 
for American worker* but would  result  in a further  trade deterioration 
tting to between  $150-200 million.55    Moreover,   the  repeal: amounti  
...   Would not markedly reduce the volume of   imports of the 
articles  that now enter  the United   States under these pro- 
visions.     Rather  the  products would continue to be  supplied 
trom abroad  by the  same concerns   but   in many cases with 
77 
fewer or no U.  S.  components,   or by other concerns  pro- 
ducing  like articles  without the use  of U.  S.   materials... 
The effects  of   repeal  on l).   S. employment can only be 
estimated.     Foreign assembly operations utilizing these 
provisions  now provide employment for about  121,000 
workers  in  foreign countries.    Only a  small   portion of 
these   jobs would  be returned  to the U. S.   if   items  807 
and   806.30 were  repealed.     On the other hand,   these 
provisions  now provide employment for about 37,000 
people   in the U.  S....   Repeal would  probably result  in 
only a modest number of  jobs  returned  to the U.  S., 
which   likely would be more  than offset by the   loss of 
jobs among workers now producing components  for exports 
and  those who further  process the  imported goods. 
(In Mexico, center of the main union argument for repeal  of TSUS  807, 
little  support can be gained:    while only 350 I).  S.   jobs  can be   identi- 
fied as  having been gained under the  program here,   only  1,700  jobs  in 
the  United  States can be said to have  been lost.)5 
The  union argument concerning   imports,  corporate   leaders agree, 
thus   loses much  of   its   impact when the  above evidence   is   presented. 
Further support  for this contention can be gained  from the  II.   S.   De- 
partment of Commerce.     Experts  here  are quick to point out that   those 
import categories which have experienced  the most rapid growth and are 
perhaps most  responsible for the displacement of U.  S.   firms, as well 
as workers   (for example,   steel,   textiles,   shoes and  automobiles),  are 
overwhelmingly the  output  of foreign-based firms,   not of American 
multinationals.     Of  the  13 million tons of  iron and  steel   imported  in 
1970,   for example,   little came  from U.   S.  subsidiaries.    Likewise, 
of  the   1,321,000 foreign cars   imported   in this same  year,  over ninety 
percent   (90*) were made by foreign-based  firms.     In cases  where  auto 
components,  another sore point with unions, were  re-exported to  the 
United States,   such  imports were   in response  to foreign competition 
and  helped to save U.   S.   jobs. 58 
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Exports 
While  the multinationals' effect on  imports   is  easy to state,   its 
effects   on exports   is   less easily discernible,    the major emphasis  of   the 
multinational corporation,  businessmen note,   has  been on   international 
production rather than direct exportation.     (Earlier   in the  paper,   it was 
reported  that  such  production was  some five  or six times   larger than ex- 
ports.)     However,  a   relationship between multinational   investment and 
overall  exporting does exist, especially in the  higher technological 
ranges.     Such a relationship,   it must  be noted,   has had a substantial 
effect on our balance of trade. 
Although a   1969 study  (made of exports   in  1965)   concluded that the 
overall  effect of   the multinational firms  on II.  S. export trade was   in- 
significant,  a  definite relationship was  shown between the multinational 
affiliate and U.   S.  exports.     (Affiliates   in  1965,  handled approximately 
twenty-one  percent - 21% - of  all  I).  S.   exports;   recent data show that an 
increase here  has occurred,   with affiliates today handling over one- 
nuarter  -  25£ - of all U.  S.  exports.)59    This  relationship has even 
greater  significance  today,  especially in the high-technology industries. 
It   is known that  the concentrations of most multinational firms  today 
are   largely in mining,   oil,   computers,  electronics and electrical equip- 
ment,   chemicals,  and  drugs,  among others.60    All  these  industries,   it can 
clearly be stated,  are among  those employing the  most advanced  techno- 
logical  techniques which,  according to 1971 Department of Commerce figures, 
have enabled them to become extremely large exporters with constantly  in- 
creasing net trade balances,  both  in absolute terms and  as a  percentage 
of  U.  S.   production.     (Two  industries,  computers and chemicals,  best   il- 
lustrate   this  favorable effect  on trade:    manufacturers of computers have 
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increased   their  trade  balance substantially since  1963,   *>oing from $181 
million  in that  veer  to $1,001  billion in  1970.    The  chemicals   industry, 
at  the   same  time,   has  seen exports greatly outdistance   imports,   mainly 
due  to the   rise   in pharmaceutical  and   industrial chemical   products.) 61 
Likewise,   the overall   trade   balance   in these   technologically-intensive 
industries   has continued   to  increase—from approximately $6 billion in 
1960 to $9.1   billion  in 1965 and  $9.6 billion   in  1970.     (This would have 
been higher had  it not  been for the Canadian-American Auto Agreement   in 
1965.)62 
In the   lower-technology  industries, exports,   it  is admitted,  have 
decreased  drastically since  the  1950,s,  running a deficit of $5 billion 
by  1970.63     However,   businessmen are quick to realize  that the   lower-cost 
foreign labor   in these   industries   is substantial;   thus any job dislo- 
cations,  due to the export decreases   in such  industries,   have been mainly 
a  result of   the   low-skill  nature  of  this work plus  the above realization. 
In order to  remain competitive at home  and abroad,  these businessmen say, 
operations   have  had  to be transferred overseas   (mainly to the under- 
developed  countries).     If   this had not  been done,   chances are these 
products today would  be wholly produced  by foreign competitors. 
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Export  Displacement 
As  far as  the displacement of U.  S. exports  by affiliates abroad, 
much controversy and   very little evidence, corporate   leaders  relate,  has 
occurred.     On the one hand,   there  is organized   labor maintaining that 
most U. S.   production abroad has been at the expense of  our exports.    An 
intermediate   position,   that  such displacement  has only occurred  for a 
short  time,   is  taken by some  analysts.     Finally,  there are those,  namely 
the multinationals, who say that  little displacement  ha.  taken  place. 
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In any extent,   the Hufbauer-Adler study cited by the  unions,   businessmen 
say,   has had   little  to add   to this controversy,  since  both authors  have 
stated  their examination revealed  much uncertainty surrounding all ex- 
port displacement estimates   in the   investigated countries.65    Likewise, 
the  study,   both men have  admitted,   covered  only manufacturing  invest- 
ments.     Foreign direct   investment of other types   (mining,   petroleum,  et 
cetera) was not   likely,  as   both have reported,  to displace  our exports 
to any significant extent.66    Until more  substantive evidence  occurs, 
corporate heads   state,  this controversy will continue. 
Other Impact 
Overall   balance of  payments effects,   in agreement with organized 
labor,  are again hard  to  judge,  due to the   length of the   recoupment 
period   involved,  which as  has been   previously stated   is extremely vola- 
tile.    Although  the Hufbauer-Adler study,   as well as  the one undertaken 
by Professor Reddaway,   are  often cited as  damaging to the multinationals, 
there  are contentions  by many economists  thpt these   studies are  essen- 
tially non-conclusive.67    Hufbauer and Adler,   it  is often argued, em- 
ployed a static model   (no real world changes due   to the  investment)   in 
their study;   in  the real world,   direct   investment may well  institute 
trequent changes   in the firm which will  greatly influence its future  per- 
formance.     Reddaway's study has been criticized for numerous  reasons, 
among  them:     his   information was  based on a small   number of  firms; 
large gaps   in   the data occurred—only 10   industries and  15 foreign 
countries were studied; and  respondents  could not know what may have 
happened had  they not made  their investment.     If anything then,   the 
above criticisms essentially illustrate the difficulties   in evaluating 
such a problem. 
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Overall Employment Effects 
Thus   the multinational corporation, businessmen state,   has not been 
the villain that organized   labor has  pictured   it to be.     Rather than 
transferring   jobs abroad,  the outflows of capital  and  technology by this 
phenomenon have  generated   positive effects  on both America's employment 
and  balance of  trade   positions   (witness the   200,000 export   jobs created 
in  1966-69 alone).     Further  support   for this  assertion  is  provided by 
probably the most extensive  study of  the multinational  firms*  operations 
to date.     In the  summer  of  1971,  as  has previously been reported,   gradu- 
ate students  and  faculty at Harvard   University made an in-depth  investi- 
gation of  nine  major manufacturing   industries which could  clearly be 
classified as multinational. These  industries,   it was  noted,  belonged 
to a group accounting for the  bulk—over ninety percent   (90 it)--of I). S. 
foreign direct   investment  in manufacturing facilities;    also noted was 
that  production   in  these  industries   ranged from food  products  to chemi- 
cals,   to petroleum,  to electrical and  transportation machinery.     (The 
nine  cases, as was   likewise  stated, were leaders  in their field; more- 
over,   only nine cases out of the  thousands available were needed  because 
their results essentially reaffirmed  those more general studies already 
completed.)    The  results of this   investigation were quite conclusive. 
Of the nine  cases  of   investment,   six—paper,  chemicals,   tires,  wire 
cable,   farm machinery,   and automobiles—were made to serve the   local 
market;   two—food and oil—were made  to serve third country markets;   and 
one—electronics—was made  to serve   the U.   S.   market.    Thus  the above 
provided substantial  support for  the   corporate  argument that most U.  S. 
foreign direct   investment   is  made to serve foreign markets   (coinciding 
with  the previously-mentioned  Department of Commerce estimates).    The 
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other results  were  also as concrete.    First of  all,   it would appear that 
the employment effects  from these   investments were quite  positive.     In 
total,   the study group estimated that roughly 250,000   jobs, most of  them 
involving production workers, would be  lost   if  there were  no II.  S. 
foreign direct   investment.     Combined with the  250,000 jobs estimated  to 
exist   in  the  parent offices  of all  II. S.   multinational  enterprises  plus 
an additional   allowance  for supporting workprs,   there would  be a total of 
approximately 600,000  jobs   relying on multinational   investment.     Secondly, 
on the  basis  of   sound   judgment,   since  little or no empirical data was 
available,   it would also seem  likely that,   if U.  S.  foreign direct   in- 
vestment did   not exist,  American exports would be  lower than they other- 
wise might  be.     In this connection,   two things would  become clearly 
evident:    with no  investment,  American workers would probably be employed 
in many  industries competing,   somewhat  inefficiently, with  lower-cost 
foreign   imports,  and,  since average American wages are relatively higher 
than elsewhere,   such  industries would   immediately find  their resource 
costs  had  risen, endangering their position even further.     Finally,  since 
American direct   investment has  taken place,  a net positive effect of  $3 
billion on the U. S.   balance of  payments has  occurred.       This effect co- 
incides with  Department of Commerce estimates during the   1960's.     Even 
as   the  II.   S.   trade   surplus was declining,   direct   investment,   then averag- 
ing between $2-$3  billion annually (after   trade  balance deductions), was 
exerting much   in the way of  positive effects on our  balance of   payments. 
Final  support  for  this contention can   be gained from a Department 
of  Commerce examination of the effects of U. S.   foreign direct   invest- 
ment  on domestic employment trends between the  years  1965-1970.     (Again, 
the   periods of  greatest  import  penetration   in the United States.) 
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According to Commerce data,   92 of  the   133 largest U.  S. direct investors 
abroad are  located   in roughly 14 Standard  Industrial Classification (SIC) 
groups,  ranging from  petroleum refining   (291),   to motor vehicles  (371), 
to communications equipment   (366). An   investigation of   these groups 
shows  that,   in eleven,  employment   increased  between  1965-1970.    The   in- 
crease  ranged   from six percent   (6&)   for paper  products  to forty-five 
(45%)   for office and  computing machine products.     For all whose employ- 
ment went up daring this period,   the composite  rate of  growth was six- 
teen  percent  (161),  nearlv equal to the  seventeen percent   (17',) rate re- 
gistered  for total U.   S.  employment during these years. Three   indus- 
tries,   including motor vehicles,  on the other hand,  registered declines 
of approximately five   percent   (5%)  during this  period.     In the motor 
vehicles   industry,   however, employment  rates often vary,   reflecting 
special  factors—one of which was  the Canadian Auto Agreement   in 1965. 73 
Concluding Statements 
Responding  to the criticism surrounding  it,   the multinational corp- 
oration,   businessmen  state,   has essentially become  a  powerful,   yet  benign, 
force  on the  international economic scene as  the   1970's  commence.     It  is 
admitted by many corporate  leaders that  this phenomenon has  resulted   in 
increased  outflows of capital and  technology;  however,  at  the  same  time, 
such outflows have had  a positive effect on the  II.   S.  economy.     Income 
from these  outflows has  been considerable  during the  past decade;   indeed, 
the   inflows  of   interest, dividends and  branch earnings on 11.   S.  direct 
investment have   risen  two and  one-half times  from $2.4 billion   in 1960 
to $6 billion   in  1970.     When  income  from fees and  royalties, which have 
tripled  since  1960,  are added,   the sum of   these   items   is  roughly $3.5 
billion more than the outflows  of  new direct  investment abroad during 
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this  period. All  of   this,   it must  be noted,   has had a positive effect 
on U.   S.   balance  of   payments   (representing approximately twelve  percent - 
12* - of  all  balance of   payments  current account receipts). 
Likewise,   the multinational  firm has greatly helped the U.  S. economy 
through  its effects on employment and exports.    Although overall unemploy- 
ment has  risen during the   past decade, employment,   in many of  those firms 
which have  been  the   largest direct   investors  overseas,   has  significantly 
increased.    Moreover,  exports   (especially  in the higher-technological 
ranges)   have also been  increased markedly due to this   phenomenon--of 
further  importance here   is  the  fact  that more than one-quarter of all 
U.   S.  exports  have   been sold  to multinational affiliates abroad.     If,  at 
the  same time,   imports have   increased and  the overall  trade balance has 
declined,   then  the   fault must  lie elsewhere,   for the multinational  firm 
cannot  take sole   blame for such events.     More than  likely,  this  blame 
rests essentially on the   inflationary increases   that have occurred within 
the  U. S.  economy during the past  seven years. 
However,   the  multinational  firm has  received much of the  blame  for 
the decline  in the  U. S.   trade balance, especially from organized   labor. 
Criticism of this  type,   businessmen suggest,  has   been entirely unfounded, 
and  several weaknesses   in the  union argument have been analyzed.     For one 
thing,   labor's estimate of  "competitive   imports"  raises  many questions. 
How can such imports  be quantified?    Are competitive  imports   in one  in- 
dustry the  same  as   those   in another?    Secondly, while organized labor has 
consistently argued against those   imports  produced by foreign workers,   it 
has  ignored   frequently those export  products produced by American  labor; 
in any estimate  of  foreign effects on domestic employment,   both sides of 
the  ledger must   be  taken   into account.    A third major weakness   in their 
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argument  has  been the union's  failure  to take   into account  the overall 
health of   the U.  S.  economy.     During the  1950's and early-middle   1960's, 
when the domestic economy operated at full employment,  foreign direct 
investment was only of  limited concern to organized   labor.    Nevertheless, 
in the  latter half  of the 1960*s,  when domestic  inflation and unemploy- 
ment were evident,   labor's concern  towards direct   investment began to  in- 
crease.    Finally,   a  fourth weakness   in the union argument  is  their 
limited understanding of   the  nature  of multinational   investment   itself. 
Most of direct   investment  by the  multinational corporation has  gone to 
the more advanced,   capital-intensive countries  of Europe and Canada.    Thus, 
how can organized   labor  say this   investment has  been to  low-cost,   cheap- 
wage countries?    Moreover,   in  this  regard,   the benefits  from such  invest- 
ment have been many,   not only on the U.   S.   economy,  but also on  the 
world's economies.     A free  flow of goods and  capital can only further 
benefit world-wide employment and   income;   this,  the multinational   firm, 
corporate   leaders   state,  has   long been   in favor of.    As  Dr.  N.   R. 
Danielian,   President of  the  International  Economic Policy Association, 
has suggested,   the multinational corporation has  done for the world 
economy what the  limited   liability company did  for Europe during  the Indus- 
trial Revolution:     namely,   pooling development capital  and  skills  and 
applying them to the entire world.76    Such benefits,   the corporations 
argue,  must  be  allowed  to continue. 
There has been a basic misunderstanding between organized  labor and 
the  multinational corporation during the   last seven   years.    This  mis- 
understanding may grow even larger  if the  impending Foreign Trade  and In- 
vestment Act of  1972   (Burke-Hartke    Act)   is  passed by the Congress.    This 
bill,   businessmen are  certain,  will undercut all   the gains  that have been 
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made  by the multinntionals  since  the early 1960's.     Too much risk will 
be   involved  for any future   investment to proceed at  the pace that  it  has 
in the  past.     Passage  of this bill would  thus be extremely unwise,  for 
not only would  the multinationals  be hurt,  but also many of  the affili- 
ate countries,   and,   inevitably, organized  labor  itself.    Labor's  un- 
easiness  towards  the multinational   has  been unwarranted;   future events, 
businessmen are  sure, will  prove this out. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
MULTINATIONAL   INVESTMENT AND AMERICAN LABOR: 
EFFECTS AND  PROPOSALS 
92 
Introductory Statements 
In the past decade  international  trade,   in the conventional sense, 
has  undergone a distinct  transformation.     Exporting and   importing,   long 
the  traditional   avenues  through which  the world's goods were  traded, 
have   been rapidly losing  in   importance to a new type of   international 
economic activity dependent entirely upon corporate direct   investment. 
As  one  result of   this activity,  Ricardo's  theory of comparative advantage 
has  also undergone considerable change.    Manufacturing has grown to re- 
place  agriculture as  the major share of world  trade.    As a consequence, 
raw materials,   the essential endowments   in Ricardo's doctrine,  have  been 
displaced   by new technological developments  by an  industrialired  society. 
Competitive advantage   in manufactures  today is  only partially dependent 
upon raw materials;   its main advantage  rests on the  capabilities of  par- 
ticular firms  to produce superior bundles  of good and  services.    Such 
production can only be done   by those  firms which are  the most efficient, 
which employ superior technical knowledge  to its fullest,  and which,  on 
the basis  of  past R&D activities,   produce the  best product—in short, 
the American multinational  corporation. 
Although the  rise to prominence  has been exceedingly rapid for the 
new phenomenon,   its power has not gone unchallenged.     Proponents claim 
that  the benefits   to be derived  from multinational   investment are 
numerous,1 and,   in all   instances,   this   investment  induces  positive ef- 
fects  on the  local, as well as American,  economies.    Critics,  most notably 
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the   trade unions, considered  such claims one-sided.2    To most unions,  no 
clearly beneficial effects  result from this  increase   in American invest- 
ment.     Indeed,   the aftermath of this outflow of  capital  and  technology 
spells disruption,  especially  in  the American economy.    Although exact 
data concerning such  arguments are not available,   union critics do not 
believe  the   issues to be as one-sided  as  proponents claim. 
Employment  Issue 
An  important dispute  generated  from these arguments concerns  the 
relationship between American direct   investment  and employment   (or un- 
employment,  as   the case may be)   in the United  States.     In this  regard, 
corporate   leaders have asserted  that multinationals,   through their many 
investments,   have contributed much   in  the way of employment opportunities 
for American workers;   labor  leaders,  on  the other hand,  disagree.     Do- 
mestic employment opportunities to these men,   instead of   increasing, 
have  been lost  by the   thousands  due  to this  investment.     In the absence 
of overall  statistical  data concerning the exact employment   impact of 
multinational   investment,   organized   labor has  thus  suggested  that  the 
government  be equipped with various measures with which to control the 
rising outflows  of capital  and   technology by such firms;3     the Burke- 
Hartke Act has been but  one such measure suggested by organized   labor. 
Although  little relevant data has  been presented by either side  in 
connection with this  phenomenon's   impact on American workers,  some assess- 
ment of  the unemployment effects  resulting from the outflows of direct 
capital   investment can be made.     However, a few clarifications are nec- 
essary in order to assess this  impact more clearly.     If the adverse 
effects on foreign workers  are  ignored,   then one can  justify the   recent 
outflows of capital and   technology only under two situations:     (1) when 
9J* 
there  is  a condition of overfull-employment at  home,   and   (2) when, at any 
level  of domestic  employment,   the   investment would not   in any event  have 
been undertaken domestically."       Under the first  situation favorable 
effects would  be  felt by all countries   involved   if  the   investment were to 
take  place.     However overfull-employment has not  been the  state  of  the 
American economy during  the  past   three years   in which  the greatest in- 
creases  in direct multinational   investment have  been made.      Under the 
second situation   it must   be assumed that  such factors as  trade and anti- 
trust  barriers,   lack of  domestic natural   resources,  favorable  treatment 
by foreign governments, and so forth,   have arisen which would make do- 
mestic  investment   infeasible,   and  hence,   foreign investment more  in- 
viting.    However,   in many cases,   other reasons,  such as  the desire for 
lower foreign  labor,  have  provided  the main emphasis for direct   investment 
abroad.6    Whatever  reasons   there are for  investing abroad,  one  point must 
be asserted:     initially,  under any set of conditions,   direct   investment 
will create unemployment effects   in  the  domestic economy due  to the out- 
flows  of capital  from American plants  to those abroad.     This   is  not to 
say that such   investment will   not  have  greater  offsetting employment 
effects as  time  passes.     It   is   to say,   however,   that some unemployment 
effects,  under most circumstances,  result as capital and  technology flow 
overseas. 
In the first chapter of   this  thesis  three   types  of multinational 
firms were classified:     (1)   the colonial,   (2)   the   international  holding 
company, and   (3)   the multinational enterprise.     Each of   these,   it must be 
noted, creates different unemployment effects  on the U.  S. economy.    On 
the one hand,   the   international  holding company poses  little or no defi- 
nite  threats  to American employment, mainly because   it is organized 
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solely  to serve   the host country.8    However,  on the other  hand,   the 
colonial   firm,   impprialistic   in nature, as  defined earlier,  as well  as 
the  multinational  enterprise,   present a discernible  threat   to the U.  S. 
economy.     Because of  their abilities  to sell  their overseas   production 
in American markets,   these  two types have   created a distinctive un- 
easiness among organized   labor.'     (Such sales,   it must   be noted again, 
increased   one   hundred and  sixty percent--160%--from 1965 to 1968 alone, 
rising from four percent of affiliate sales   in 1965 to over eight  percent 
in  1968.)*       Whether this uneasiness will   increase   in the  future remains 
to be  seen. 
As  has already been discussed, most of  past American direct   invest- 
ment  has originated  under the   third  type of  firm presented  above—the 
multinational   enterprise.    The management skills and organization know- 
how  inherent   in this classification,   some economists have noted,  have 
allowed   it  to attain a forefront position   in  '.'. S.   domestic and foreign 
investment and   trade.     As  this attainment has occurred controversy has 
increased.     Not unexpectedly,   many  labor leaders have characterized  this 
phenomenon as  detrimental  to the classical  concepts of  free   trade.    To 
these men,   such  investment has   not resulted   in  international  trade but 
rather  international   production,  or   in an extension of  the domestic 
market power of these firms across  global   lines.     Such firms,  rather 
than both producing and selling in the United States, have chosen to 
produce   in either Taiwan,  Mexico or Europe and sell much of  this  produc- 
tion here.     In  this connection   lower  resource costs abroad,   instead of 
trade  barriers  or other factors,  have  been the  real motive   for   investing 
overseas.     Realizing the  threat   imposed by such circumstances  on American 
workers,   most union officials  have thus begun to argue  that   those economic 
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principles applicable   to domestic   production are more appropriate   in des- 
cribing  this  phenomenon than Ricardo's  doctrine of comparative advantage 
and   the "gains  from trade." 
Multinational   Pricing Policies 
To  illuminate  this  point,  a consideration of  the multinationals' 
pricing policy must  be examined.     It has already been established that 
size   is  the decisive factor  in the corporate decision  to invest abroad; 
in other words,   the   largest domestic corporations, embodying the greatest 
percentage of American market   power,   are also the  leading multinationals. 
Coinciding with this emphasis on size   is the ability of such firms to 
"set  the   pace" as  far as their  industry's  pricing and  production policies 
are concerned.    As a result of  this  ability to "administer" domestic 
prices, a   "monopoly   return"   (one  far above  a competitive norm)  should 
result   in such firms'  profits.     This   pricing aspect of  production,   it 
must  be  stated,   need  not be   limited entirely to the domestic operations 
of   these   firms. 
If   the objectives of most multinationals, as  has  been cited earlier, 
are   to  integrate  the activities of  their affiliates within the  sub- 
structure   of the  parent company,  then their overseas  pricing policy must 
be an essential  part of such  integration.    As  one observer has written: 
This suggests a  perfect price discrimination model   in 
which the multinational firm will charge "what   the 
traffic will   bear"  in  the various markets   in which  the 
output   is sold.    This should  mean that when the output 
is sold  domestically   its price will be  influenced  if 
not determined by the domestic  price of an   identical 
product or,   in the case of displacement, of a  pre- 
viously domestically-produced   identical  product. 
Thus what this means  is that most,  if  not all,   of the  powerful  at- 
tributes  of the domestic multinationals, such as their high degree of 
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market  power or their ability to "set"  prices,   are  likely to be trans- 
ferred   to their oversea? affiliates.     As a result of  this  transference 
the  price  of  any commodity produced  abroad and sold   in the II.  S.  market 
is   likely to reflect   a "monopoly return" gained by such advantages.     If 
this  happens,   if  the firms can   sell  the  lower-cost,   foreign-produced 
output at American prices   (thus earning "monopoly"  benefits),   then most 
"gains  from  trade" are nullified. 
If such a  model has any validity,   then other unemployment   implica- 
tions arise.     Many  labor economists  have noticed  that unions often push 
for wage  increases even when total  unemployment  is growing.14    When this 
happens   (when the   labor market may become  "soft" due to the  union push), 
the multinational   firm may choose  to further reduce employment rather 
than  price,  especially  if  this firm is a price "administrator."    This 
reduction   in employment  only  serves to further  restrict output and to 
maintain the  product-price at a  level above that produced   by competi- 
tion.15    In  the  aggregate, as  one economist notes,   if such practices 
continue,   the economy begins to experience  higher-risin?, prices along 
with   increasing unemployment  or,   as many tpxts   have   named   it,   the  "un- 
employment-inflation dilemma. ..16 
Barrier to Entry Issue 
Further observations are also  in order at this   point.    Economic 
theory has  suggested  that   in   industries controlled  by one or a very few 
firms  possessing much market  power several  barriers   to entry are  likely 
to be constructed which would  severely limit competition within such   in- 
dustries.     Professor George Stigler, among others, has defined  these 
barriers  to   include the  following: 
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(1) Economics  of  scale  (corporate largeness) within  the   industry 
(2) Economies of   scale  for capital   (whpre  only a few firms  possess 
the large amounts of capital   needed  for entry) 
(3) Superior  resources   (both natural and unnatural) 
(U)     Franchises and   patents 
(5)     The  pace  of entry 
In regard  to the  last classification,   Stigler  recognizes that no 
monopoly can  last forever;   however, entry  into the   industry can   be delayed 
either  through secrecy or  by not seizing  the entire profits  that could be 
gained   in the  total absence of entry. Furthermore,   in order  to retain 
these barriers,  micro-economic  theory also suggests   that the market   price 
in such  industries  not  be set  at  too high a level so as to be "entry- 
inducing."19    If this happens,  new competition,  attracted by the favorable 
price, may enter the market.    The  price should be  set at that   level which 
will  be  "entry-forestalling,"  taking   into account the  other barriers   just 
mentioned.     At any rate,  whatever price  is estpblished  it will more   than 
20 
likely be  above that of  one comnetitively-deterrained. 
It must now be maintained  that,   if  international  production  is merely 
an extension of  this  domestic  market   power,   then the above anti-competi- 
tive conditions  are likely to be  transferred overseas,   especially since 
foreign competitors  are  less well-known  (smaller)  and   thus   less  likely 
to operate on the same  scale as American-based multinationals. If 
such conditions arise,   then unemployment,  as well as  the other anti- 
competitive aspects of  domestic American monopolies,  may increase   in the 
American economy. 
A Restatement 
In the above analysis, attention has  been centered  on approximately 
two major assumptions:     (1)   initially, the multinational corporation 
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creates  unemployment effects through  its outflows of capital and   produc- 
tion  facilities;   these  may decline as   income  from such outflows   is  re- 
patriated  to our economy,   and   (2)  such effects are greater when some of 
the affiliates'   production re-enters   the  'Inited States.    Corporate 
leaders,   it  is stated,   have objected to these assumptions  citing:     (1) 
the  hundreds of thousands  of   jobs created by such multinationals   (especi- 
ally from  1965-1970);   (2)   that more than eighty percent  (80&)  of   the 
affiliates'   sales  are made   in the country where  the  production facility 
is   located,   whereas only eight  percent   (81)   are   re-exported  to  the United 
States   (here again see   labor's argument  in Chapter  II);  and   (3)   the 
positive contributions of  this  investment to the U.  S.   balance of   payments. 
However,   in the  light of more concrete,   up-to-date  information,  several 
factors must   be  restated:     (1)  the   leading multinationals  today are  the 
giant American  corporations;   (2)   these  same corporations have gained much 
in the way of domestic market power,   in many cases dominating their  res- 
pective   industries;   (3)   if  their overseas production  is only an extension 
of  this   power,  which  in many  instances   it clearly must  be,   then much  in 
the way of  anticompetitive  conditions   ("administered"   prices,  barriers to 
entrv,   "monopoly returns")   may be   increased;  and   (*»)   an  increasing  per- 
centage of   this production,   reflecting the   above,   is  delivered  back home 
to be   sold  at  u.   S.   price?.     In this   latter case  adverse welfare effects 
may result.     As a consequence of  the above,  employment opportunities may 
rise. 
Turner Thesis 
Professor   turner has  stated that the  problem of such "runaway corpo- 
rations"   is  about to swamp America.22    The United  States,  he notes,  has 
been  in the   past a relatively high-wage economy,   protected  by both  its 
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isolation from Europe and  Japan and the high productivity of   its   labor. 
However,   the American  lead   in management and  technology has   been  rapidly 
disappearing;   as  a result,   the U.  S.  market  in the 1970's has  become 
vulnerable  to foreign competition.     Noting  the wage differentials   between 
countries such as  Mexico,  Taiwan,  and  the United States, Turner admits 
the  multinationals would  be   foolish  if  they did  not utilize   these  markets 
as a  means  of production.    With exactly this  in mind many corporations 
have   thus  left America's confines  seeking the lower-wage labor that is  to 
be   found overseas.     (Much   in   the way,   for example,   that numerous  northern 
corporations  have  gone South   to exploit  the lower-cost  labor  there.) 
Such endeavors,   microeconomic  theory suggests,  are but one aspect of 
the   rational decision-making  process of   the domestic multinational  corpo- 
ration.     In this  connection,   the desire  for lower production costs,  with 
subsequent higher profits,   has enhanced  the firm's   leadership role   in  its 
respective   (domestic)   industry.     lhus,   it  is only logical that  this  desire 
should  be extended   to the firm's direct   investment overseas.     However,  as 
the  1970's have commenced and  this process  has  increased,  organized   labor 
has   become   increasingly worried about such trends.     Unless  protective 
action is taken,   union leaders reason,   the current  outflows  of capital 
may mean the  end  of certain   labor-intensive   industries   in the U. S. 
economy.     With this   in mind,   the   Burke-Hartke Act  has   thus received  labor's 
hearty endorsement for  this Act would essentially undercut all  future 
multinational   investment.    Through   its numerous  provisions,   the Act would 
probably remove much of the  freedom that has surrounded American  direct 
investment   in the  past.     Although  the   bill   is relatively new in design, 
many Congressmen agree with   its assertions.23    As  developments   in Mexico 
and Taiwan,   for example,   unfold, more Congressmen are   likely to join 
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the   ranks. 
Title  III,   tturke-Hartke Bill 
Nevertheless,  in the absence of available  data concerning the multi- 
nationals'   impact on American employment,   many students of economics   have 
objected   to the obvious protectionist   intent behind  this bill.     No de- 
tailed analysis  of the bill can  be made  until   it is   introduced on the 
floor of Congress   (which  probably will  not occur until  1972) and   proceeds 
through the   legislative  process.     However,   the   protectionist  provisions 
in the Act, as  first announced, are clear.     Though other provisions are 
2k 
Important,   the key title,  as  organized  labor views  it, is Title   III. 
This   provision calls   for the use  of import quotas as protection against 
foreign-affiliate production.     In fact,  nil  future  products which enter 
the   United States would be   subjected  to an annual   quota based  on the 
number of units  of   that product  that entered here between   1963-1969. 
In  this  respect,   the Act makes  no distinction between third-country 
multinational operations,  multinational  imports, or conventional   imports; 
all would  be subject  to the quota. 
As  any economics   textbook will assert,   import quotas, much  like 
tariffs,  are  mainly devices  to restrain free   trade  and are,  hence econo- 
mically undesirable.25    Designed  to restrict the volume of  imports enter- 
ing a  country through  the   imposition of quantitative   limitations,  this 
policy technique  reduces   international   trade by virtually severing inter- 
national   price-cost   links.     In allowing the domestic  price mechanism to 
work only up to the  point  that  the quota   is   filled   the   restriction  largely 
renders all   price  considerations   irrelevant  beyond  this point.     One   result 
of   such a restriction  is almost  assured:     the domrstic price   in the 
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country  imposing the  quota   is  quicklv raised above  the world price. 
How far  above dep? nds  upon the magnitude of  the quota and  the elasti- 
cities   involved.    Who does  this  help?    Certainly not the consumer,   for he 
is  forced   to  pay the higher domestic price for the  protected  good.     Do- 
mestic employment may be helped somewhat since   the   quota reduces   imports 
while maintaining exports;   however,  this situation may not   last for any 
length of time   if other countries  retaliate with controls of their own 
and  because of  the adverse   income effects   in the  foreign country.    Clearly, 
all  countries cannot simultaneously reduce   imports and maintain exports; 
thus if a country tries to spread  its unemployment internationally, with 
others  subsequently following,  nothing  is  gained.    As   Professor  Delbert 
Snider states,   the only ones  most likely  to benefit  from this   restriction 
are  those   special-interest groups who have  placed  the   law on the  books. 
In  total,   it   is hard   to see   how this device aids   international  trade or 
domestic  producers,   for in disrupting the price mechanism,   the. quota only 
allows many  inefficient firms  and industries to maintain production. 
One can sympathize with those employees  in   industries  rendered  un- 
viable by the competitive growth from lower-wage economies   (textiles, 
for example).     This   is often  the   reason the  quota  is   imposed.     However, 
with the existence of such a   policy  technique,   there   is always  the chance 
that an   inefficient   industry will   be maintained;   thus,   objectively,   such 
industries should be allowed   to decline.    A strong protectionist case can 
probably  be made for .any "infant"   industries   in the underdeveloped world, 
yet none can be made  for such  industries   in the United  States.     If   these 
industries  are   inefficient,   provisions such as  "adjustment assistance" 
should be  utilized.    The American consumer cannot afford to  subsidize 
this   inefficiency forever nor can  the  international arena.     Relief by way 
103 
of quotas amounts  to subsidies. 
Though other  provisions are   included   in the Burke-Hartke Act,28 the 
main  protectionist thrust of the  Act   is focused on this one  key provision. 
The   labor union aim here   is  rather clear:     imports from the multinational 
corporations are   the  primary reasons   for the main unemployment  increases 
in the  United States during the  past  few years.     Therefore,   imports must 
be  reduced,   and with them multinational  investment itself.     However,   it 
is  this writer's  belief   that such will not happen.    Multinational   invest- 
ment   is   too well-entrenched   in   international trade and economics today 
to be easily dislodged.     Indeed,   in the future  such investment may be  the 
core  of   international economics.    The   large American firms are the   leading 
multinationals and  the   unions will have to come   to grips with this fact of 
life.     Protectionist measures to decrease   their effectiveness or market 
power may work   in the short run  but,   in the   long run,   international   poli- 
tical   realities  make such protection   impossible.    Thus other proposals 
must  be  put   forth  for the  unions  to survive   in their competition with  the 
irultinationals.     Protectionist measures,   s ich as  the ones embodied   in the 
Bnrke-Hartke  Act  will   not be  effective   in   the   long-run. 
Alternatives   to Protectionism 
Adjustment Assistance 
One  of   the valid alternatives to  the protectionist restrictions pre- 
viously mentioned   has  been the creation of adjustment assistance under 
the Trade  Expansion Act  of  1962.29    In  this Act  the U.  S.   government recog- 
nized   two essential facts:     (1)   that   labor,  unlike the other factors of 
production,  was more  immobile and  hence  less  able  to be  transferred from 
one   region to another;  and   (2)   import competition could  result  in severe 
hardship on this   less-mobile  resource.     Realizing further that many 
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American workers,  due to an increase  in   imports, would need special 
assistance   in relocating or job retraining,   the Congress enacted this com- 
prehensive   program to provide such aid.     However,   results   in  the  recent 
past  have   been  less than encouraging. 
To qualify for adjustment assistance,  as  originally proposed, a 
firm must  have  shown three   things:    "(1)   the  article  in question must be 
imported   in  increased quantities;   (2)  the  increased   imports  must be 
caused   * in major part'  by a   trade  concession;  and   (3)   increased  imports 
must  be   'the major factor'  causing injury to the party in question." 
In all  the cases  that came  before the Tariff Commission between 1962 and 
1968,   however, not one   instance was found to quality for such assistance, 
principally because the  firm could not prove provisions 2 or 3 above. 
(Between 1969-1970,  the AFL-CIO notes,   there were only six findings of 
such  injury.)32    The record  raised serious doubts as to whether it was 
possible to segregate trade concessions,  many of which went back 30 
years  or more,   from other  reasons as  the major cause of  increased  imports. 
In this respect, a  firm's weakened condition could have arisen from 
factors such as  location,   the  labor market,  product competition,  and   so 
forth,   even  though the   increase   in   imports may have been a major factor 
but  not "the" major factor.     Experience  thus  suggests that,   if  the program 
was   to be helpful,   the   language of   this provision would have  to be 
clarit ied. 
in a  special   report  to the Resident  in January.   1969.   by a board 
composed  of  both  labor and corporate heads,   the beginnings of such 
clarification were undertaken.     First,   it was  recommended   that  the 
criteria  in the   1962 Act for adjustment assistance be amended  to "eliminate 
the  requirement that  increased  imports  be causally linked to past tariff 
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concessions." In this connection,  the  group realized   it was  hard   to 
separate one cause tor  injury from another.    Secondly,   it was  suggested 
that   the Act be amended  to require only that  increased   imports   be a  sub- 
stantial  cause of unemployment   in the firm,  not the major one. The 
board   here noted   that this would   require a  petition from the workers   in- 
volved  stating that   imports had  had considerable bearing on the amount of 
unemployment   in their tirm;   the   petitioners would not, however,   have to 
demonstrate  that such  imports were greater than any other cause of   injury. 
In addition,   the  group recommended that an   inter-agency board, other than 
Taritt  Commission,   be executively appointed  to deal with  this program. 
This,   the  board  noted,   has already bern done   in onp   industry.     Under the 
Automotive   Products Trade Act of  1965,  evidence  obtained   from an  im- 
partial  committee   indicates   that the concept of adjustment assistance 
was extremely viable   in  the auto  industry,  and could consequently be 
employed  as  an alternative to import displacement.         thirdly,   the  board 
advised   that   the  provisions of  the Manpower Development and Training Act 
of  1962   (as  amended   in   1968)  should be so implemented as to give workers 
in endangered   industries advance warning of  the   impact of   imports  on 
their respective   industries.36     In this  regard,  the  board urged that all 
manpower  policies  be  re-examined   in order to improve the mobility of 
labor.     finally,  the  group advocated   that all grievances concerning world 
fair  labor standards  be   reviewed  by an  international  agency,   such as GATT 
or  the   ILO,   in order  to determine   if any enforcing  of such  standards was 
needed. 3/ 
Although  the Taritt   Commission has  implemented  some  (but not many) 
of  these  suggestions and  has  tried to chan?e the  situation,  viz., 
recently certifying definite injury to 11  firms and   15,000 workers   (with 
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18 $250 million as  compensation)       organized   labor  is  still  skeptical as  to 
this   program's  benefits.     Thus the concept essentially remains  ineffec- 
tive   today. This  skepticism  is due mainly to three  reasons.     First, 
on the  basis  of  the  previous  ten years' experience with the  program, 
labor  leaders can see no substantive gains from it as a whole.     Second, 
the   program itself   is  viewed  by the AFL-CIO as merely a supplement to 
the "more needed"  protectionist  Burke-Hartke Act.    Those workers who 
have already been adversely affected   by  imports,  union leaders agree, 
should  be aided.     Moreover,   the   imports   themselves,   the cause of  such 
job losses,  should  be   stopped.    Third,   organised   labor  is extremely dis- 
trustful  of   the  Tariff Commission   itself   (remembering  the stringent 
rulings by the Commission   in  the  r>ast)   and advocate   instead a  Presi- 
dential  Commission to find cause  for injury.    Until   these conditions and 
others are   met,   union  leaders  reason there can  be no further cause for 
discussion   in this area. 
It   is   the contention of this writer that the concept of adjustment 
assistance  as described   in the previously-mentioned suggestions,  unlike 
the protectionist  Burke-Hartke Act,  offers  the  unions a   longer-lasting 
solution to their  problem.     Union   leaders have  only become uneasy about 
multinational   investment   in the   last  five  years.    However,   it must again 
be  repeated,   direct multinational   investment  is  so large   in scope  as to 
be easily reduced  and  the unions must  learn  to live with  it.    To dis- 
credit out  of hand   the program of adjustment assistance  is   to ask for 
unnecessary friction.     If   implemented correctly, with   the suggestions as 
Presented above,   the  program offers the unions much   in the way of com- 
pensation from  job losses as «il  as an opportunity for retraining   in 
another area.    Until   their views of the  multinational corporation can 
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mature  over time   the unions would do well to try to improve   this  concept 
of adjustment   aseistnnce   instead of discrediting it.    The  adjustment 
assistance concept   is consistent with classical economic principles which 
encourage   mobility and   flexibility in the economic  system. 
International Unionism 
In dealing with the multinational  corporation today organized   labor 
finds   itself   in a precarious  situation.    Unlike the early days of their 
organization labor unions   in the  1970's  have  found   they are   bargaining 
with a business  structure  that  is   international   in design and capable of 
affecting their survival  with one  quick  investment  decision.     Consequently, 
with  this   realization   in mind,  most  labor leaders have  become uneasy 
towards  this  phenomenon and are not quite sure how to deal with it.     Most, 
it must  be  stated, but not all.     For some  union  leaders have  begun to 
understand   fiat  the most effective way,   possibly the only way,   to deal 
with this  highly efficient overseas organization   is through advocating 
their own   beliefs abroad — in other words,   international  unionism.     In 
this   respect,  the   International  Metalworkers   Federation   (with   11  million 
members and world councils   in the automotive,  steel,  shipbuilding,  and 
electrical   industries)  and  the   International   Federation of Chemical 
Workers   have  been the most   influential.1*0    However,  these  plans made 
little  headway until   1966, when four automotive  councils were created 
under the   joint  sponsorship of the  IMF  (International Metalworkers Fed- 
eration)  and the UAW.     Each of these four councils (one each  for Ford and 
General Motors, another for Chrysler,     Fiat,  Simca and  Rootes.  and the 
other for   Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz) were  designed to bring together 
all union  personnel concerned with their respective companies'  global 
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>*2 activities. Though meetings with  the top management officials of Ford 
and GM were  held  in    Detroit of  this  same year  very little   in the way of 
collective   bargaining was done.    Not until  the following year did  the 
councils   begin  to "show their worth." 
In  1965,   it must  be   remembered,   the United  States-Canadian Auto 
Agreement was  signed.     One  union fear  resulting from this agreement was 
that   American  jobs  might   be  underlined  by   lower  Canadian wages.     With 
this  fear  in mind,   the   UAW  in 1967 pet about to establish Canadian-U.   S. 
wage  parity   in  this   industry.     Although  Ford, which suffered   the major 
auto strike  during this year refused   to capitulate,  the  HAW managed  to 
gain significant concessions from the weaker Chrysler firm.     Chrysler 
guaranteed   that   the "40C per hour wage differential  suffered by its   13,000 
43 Canadian employees would be wiped  out within two and one-half  years." 
This was  the   first notable  example  of   international collective  bargaining. 
Since  1967   the  UAW,   today one of the  few unions  to represent workers 
on both  sides  of  the border, has continued  to maintain its   leadership in 
this  international aspect of  unionism.     Numerous   illustrations of  this 
role  have   included  the following:     (1) One  of  the most radical steps has 
been   to arrange   informal discussion meetings  between  international  dele- 
gations  of  union   leaders and management leaders of such  firms as Ford and 
General  Motors.     Though no collective bargaining has occurred,   policy 
statements  have  been  issued which have  il'ustrated   the   importance of  such 
meetings.4"     (2)  Another aspect of this role is  seen through the computer- 
ized dissemination of   information concerning grievances,   bargaining  pro- 
cedures,  and  wage   rates to all   its members both  domestic  and  foreign.45 
(In this connection,   the union  has  recently completed studies  of the 
entire collective   bargaining situation  in Latin America and  Europe where 
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contracts now include many of   those same stipulations as are found   in 
U.   S. union agreements.) (3)   Finally, much  in  the way of   technical 
assistance,  seminars, and solidarity assistance have also resulted from 
this   role. 47 
International Harmonization of Wages 
In spite ol   the   importance  of the  above achievements,   there   is 
perhaps  one  major  objective   towards  which   the   1IAW has   been  working;   that 
is,   the eventual   goal  of complete, world-wide,   harmonization of wages and 
working conditions.    This objective  has probably been best summarized  by 
the  UAW's original  leader,  Walter Reuther: 
Never again should workers go to the   bargaining  table 
without  knowing what  their employer has already agreed 
to   in negotiations with unions   in other lands.     Thanks 
to the World Auto Council  program,  this  documentation 
is now available.   .   .   .   We   .   .   .   know our employers 
are most anxious   to take advantage of weaknesses   in the 
labor movement.    Consequently, we reason, we  togginust 
abandon the  rigid frames  of national  reference. 
It   is hoped  that  implementation of this  goal can begin   in  1973 when 
the   UAW's  contracts with Ford, General  Motors, and Chrysler are  re- 
negotiated.     However,  for this end  to be attained, cooperation with  its 
overseas affiliates  must be evidenced;   thus,   the DAW has struck a   bargain 
with many of  its affiliates   in  several  countries, notably Britain and 
Canada, whereby they will  coordinate   their bargaining against the  major 
auto manufacturers and will   swar  Information about  ,foments  struck  in 
all   the   plants  of   these  firms."9    The   future  of   these  affiliates   hence 
lies  ahead;   if  the multinationals are  to be  checked,  this aspect  of 
unionism must work. 
Though  there are   18 international  secretariats   (global  federations 
of  unions)   in the world  today,   only a few are strong enough to bargain 
no 
with multinational management.    Among these are the  International Metal- 
workers   Federation,  of which  the  aforementioned World Auto Council   is  a 
part,  and   the   International   Federation of Chemical Workers.50    Although 
the  former,  mainly through the   influence of the  UAW,   has  received most 
of  the  international attention focused  on these  federations,   it  is per- 
haps the   latter which  has  been  the most ambitious. 
Worldwide attention was first  focused on the   ICF  in early 1969 during 
contract disputes   involving  the   French multinational  glass firm,   St. 
Gobain. This firm is thp  largest  glass monufacturer   in Europe   today 
with   143  plants  scattered over 12 countries,   the  U.  S.   included.     Towards 
the  beginning of 1969,   contracts with four of its subsidiaries   in France, 
West  Germany,   Italy, and the United States,  came up for renewal.     During 
the course  of  these negotiations,  the  ICF,   looking for suitable multi- 
nationals   to tackle,  entered  the picture.    Coordinating support   for 
these negotiations,  the   federation  reached agreements with all  four sub- 
sidiaries whereby no contract was  to be signed until all gave  their per- 
mission.    After weeks of  various supporting strikes   in the countries 
involved,   St.  Gobain'S  management conceded defeat and granted a new nine 
percent  (9*)   per annum wage package   for  the  four subsidiaries, despite 
previous   losses  for two years  in at   least one of the  subsidiaries   (U.S.). 
Since   this time,  the   ICF has grown  in size   (86 unions   in 33 countries) 
until  there  are almost  three million members within  its affiliates  today.52 
Its work has  become worldwide   in nature with, a-nong its more  interesting 
disputes,   those concerning the  pressure  Placed on Swiss-based multi- 
nationals   in behalf  of unionists   in J,Pan.
53 and with   its efforts   to intro- 
duce  to  the   United States  the   job security won by German unions.     In this 
latter arrangement German workers over  50 years old cannot  be fired;  also. 
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workers with  15-20 years  seniority must  be given 12  months*  notice  plus 
12 months  severance pay in case of   job loss.5"    Similarly,   this  federa- 
tion  has also  become  interested   in trying to  internationalize demands for 
continuous  training,   industrial  democracy, and worldwide   integration of 
nanual  and  non-manual workers. Finally,  on an even more  ambitious  scale, 
the   ICF  is   today in the  process of  setting up a data-bank on the collec- 
tive   bargaining agreements  struck worldwide  by 30 major chemical multi- 
nationals.     Charles Levinson,   its  head,  hopes  to have  this  bank fully 
operative  by the end  of this year   (1972)  based   on computers  owned by 
German and  U.   S.-affiliated  unions.     Naturally,   there  may be some diffi- 
culties   in comparing different agreements  since,  among other things, 
earnings  can be calculated   in various ways—salaries,   piecework,  overtime, 
for example—but   the   idea   is that any affiliated union will   be able  to 
arrange a  printout of all relevant  information about  a firm's concessions 
around  the world,   other bargains   in the  same country,  and so forth. 
Although the  scheme   is ambitious   in scope,   there   is no reason to think 
it  cannot  work. 
Other unions   just  recently have also become   interested   in the   inter- 
national   aspects   of   their  respective  organizations.     Following  the   auto- 
motive   lead  has   been the U.   S.-based International  Union of Electrical 
','orkers   (IUE),   the   union  in the electronic   Industry.     Created  in September, 
1970,   this group  initially focused   its efforts  on General Electric and 
Phillips  Electric  and  recently called for a worldwide  boycott of GE's 
products  during a   U.  S.-based  strike.57    It also intervened   in electrical 
workers'   strikes   in Latin America and Japan.58    Although relatively little 
has  been accomplished by this  federation to date,   its  beginnings are 
notable.     Other union efforts,   though comparatively modest  in design, 
have also begun  in the oil,59 steel and  rubber  industries.     The 
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Steelworkers   Union,  another council within  the   IMF,   has provided much in 
the way of   solidarity aid,   including  information on salaries, dividends, 
and working conditions   to those   unions  about   to embark on the  bargaining 
process. The United  Rubber Workers  has formed councils  to deal with 
Michelin,   a multinational with over eighty percent   (804)   of   its workers 
overseas. All   the above efforts are, at the moment,   restricted  to 
isolated  cases and   individual  firms.     However, as   these  unions  increase 
the quality of their  information services which the UAW and   the   1CF have 
already accomplished,  and emphasize aid to  their fellow-workers overseas 
such   instances may become more  commonplace. 
Writer's  View 
It   is   this writer's contention  that  international   unionism today is 
perhaps   the  only significant countervailing force against  the  power of 
the multinational corporation.     Indeed, where  union organization has  been 
strong IMF and   ICF),  disparities   in wages,   fringe  benefits,  and working 
conditions  have been  reduced  for overseas workers.     If   international 
unions,  mostly American-based,  are determined   there are numerous ways 
their  power can  increase against  the multinationals.    Among them are: 
(1) A   really determined  union can block several multinational 
plants which  produce key components for worldwide  sale,   in 
many cases shutting them down to prevent a shifting of 
operations  from plant to plant during a strike   (St. Gobain, 
for   instance). 
(2) Such unions  can conduct  publicity campaigns  concerning 
multinational malpractices  hidden from public view.     In 
this  respect,   the   ICF.   in winning  large  wage  hikes  and 
.62 
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onp   hundred percent   (100 *»)  unionization for a firm once 
threatened   to employ national  advertising and full 
coverage   in all media   it   the  issue was  not  settled. 
(3) Representatives   in Congress  or  Parliament can be 
pressured  by labor unions to  provide assistance   in nego- 
tiations with powerful  multinationals.     Here, European 
laws establishing an  international right of  workers   to 
be  that of  firms  revealing the financial status of  their 
subsidiaries  have  been instituted   in a  few countries. 
(4) Finally,   financial aid from the more advanced  unions, 
especially those   in America and Europe,  may be given to 
strikers   in other countries.    As one economist notes, 
such goals  as  the above, as well   as  that of  overall 
global bargaining,  may be accomplished   if   these  unions 
are willing to forget  their political   differences and 
join together to bargain with the multinational raanage- 
mpnts.     In the past,   however,  s .ch tasks  have often 
proved   formidable. 
Some Difficulties 
America's  brand of organized  unionism has  proven difficult  to 
implement   in many of the unions overseas.     Examples   of  this  have  in- 
eluded  the  following: 
(1) In West Germany,  unions are highly nationalistic and many 
are company-oriented. 
(2) in  Italy,  thirty percent   (MS of all unions members are 
concentrated   into four  politically-oriented unions. 
(3) Franc, has  little or no autonomous unionism a, such. 
lli* 
(«»)     In Britain,   principally through the efforts of American 
organized   labor,   the  number of craft unions has   been 
reduced.     However,   these  unions are still  politically- 
oriented and  bargaining procedures,   by U.   S.   standards, 
w   •     66 are  archaic. 
(5) In Canada, where unionism hns been extremely strong, workers 
have nevertheless often been torn between French and English 
ideologies. 
(6) In Japan,   there exists seven major unions.    All,  however, 
are  undermined   by historical  support of  the  lifetime em- 
ployment system and  resulting close  links with management, 
and  are further weakened by organisation along company 
rather than  industry lines. 
(7) In  Mexico and  the Far East   (Taiwan,     South Korea)  unioni- 
zation, especially in the electrical components*   industries, 
£ q 
has either been rudimentary in design or non-existent. 
As  a consequence of   this difficulty,  many U.  S.   labor leaders haven given 
up trying to utilize  international  unionism as a device  against the multi- 
national corporation,  concentrating instead on protectionist   legislation. 
Yet,   the  ones who have  adhered   to this   idea  have experienced   success. 
Summary Statement 
A. organized  labor enters  the  1970's. not quite certain how to deal 
with multinationalism,  the   protectionist Burke-Hartke Act   has been 
offered  as  the  unions'  only chance of survival against this   phenomenon. 
Nevertheless,   it  is  this writer's belief that on!y  international unionism 
provide,  this   chance,  for  protectionist  legislation is not going to work 
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if  the foreign countries   retaliate.    This  is what the more concerned 
unions   (the  UAW,  for example)  fear will happen.    Hence,  the Trade Secre- 
tariats  have  begun to grow in   importance as   international cooperation 
among many of   these concerned  unions has developed.    Where corporate 
decision-making has  become more  diffused  from the  local community,  many 
overseas anc1  domestic unions have   joined  together  in order to deal more 
fully with this "distant corporate management."        For all unions   to con- 
tinue  to function as • viable force in this ever-changing decade  this 
aspect of  union activities must be allowed  further growth.     Protectionist 
legislation,   to offset this phenomenon,   is only a  short-term measure and, 
as  such,  should not  be given the  serious attention that   it has attained. 
As  Professor Vernon has noted,   the multinational corporation is  strong, 
and when confronted  by an adversary, has options that U.   S.   labor does 
not.71     Its management  is  young and extremely intelligent and  is quite 
willing to   take advantage of the   rational benefits  to be gained  from 
international   production.    Organized labor, for the most   part,   is  run by 
an extremely conservative  older generation and  is often loathe   to engage 
in any   international union relations abroad.    Generally speaking,   it must 
be  noted   that  those  unions which have enjoyed any success   in this area 
have  been   run by younger,  more energetic,   leaders.    Consequently,  multi- 
national   production could well   lr.d  to organized   labor's decline  in the 
1970's.   unless   international unionism is given first  priority.    A dynamic 
emphasis  on   international   unionism together with a program of comprehen- 
sive adjustment assistance  to help those workers adversely affected  by 
foreign competition may thus  be the only answer to any unemployment 
effects   generated  by the multinational corporation  in the   1970's. 
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CHAPTER  V 
SUMMARY AND  CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The quotations below illustrate three major views that characterize 
discussion about the multinational corporation today. They also summar- 
ize   the  subject matter of   this   thesis: 
Businessmen   in  the  Free World are buildino, an   inter- 
national   economy,   an  economy which  transcends  old 
borders and old  ideologies   .   .   .   the   international 
corporations and world commerce are the most effec- 
tive  supranational  relationships  the world has and 
they survive and flourish  today)   in a  political   and 
legal world designed  in an earlier era. 
We view with real concern the warmness with which the 
administration  has embraced   the multinational  corpo- 
rations as  being "good  for America."    These   inter- 
national  runaway firms,  however,  do not have the same 
sense of warmness for America.    Their heart  is  the 
profit dollar..   .   . As a result of   this attitude, 
corporations  have abandoned  U.  S.   factories and U. S. 
communities.   .   .   . They have   abandoned  tens of 
thousands  of American men and women  (also) who once 
worked   in their U. S.   plants. 
"Potentially,  the multinational  company is  an  overwhelming force for 
material   progress   in the world.     The  best of  their products, we  should . 
accept;   the  political and social cost, we must not overlook."" 
With  respect to the  first quotation or what  this writer has called 
the   protagonists'   position,   the  phenomenon   is  described  as  a   benign   force, 
acting   in  the   international   arena  to   free world  coital   and   technology 
for  the   betterment  of  all   countries   concerned.      In  this   role,   the  multi- 
national company,   as   Professor C.   P.  Kindleberger of M.I.T.   notes,   has 
operated  much   like   a  domestic  corpora 
tion   in  developing a  national  market 
within  the United  States. *    In the course of   this  development,   it has 
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broken down  regional trade barriers,   created thousands  of II.   5.   export- 
oriented   jobs, contributed positively to the U.   S.  balance of   payments, 
led to a  more equal  and wider distribution of  economic  benefits,  and has 
greatly aided   in the   impressive  surge  ot  our overall economic   growth. 
With  respect to the second quotation,  or what can be described as 
the antagonists'   position,  this phenomenon  has  been looked  upon with much 
skepticism and concern.     In adopting this  viewpoint,  organized   labor has 
characterized the multinational corporation as  "runaway"   in  impact, 
rapidly leaving American markets for the  lower-cost productive facilities 
and   labor abroad.    Thus,  as capital,  managerial   skills,  and   technology 
have moved  across national   borders at  an accelerating rate,   labor—one  of 
the  least mobile of the factors  of production—has  developed an increas- 
ingly negative  assessment  of the effects of such flows.    Contrary to 
corporate  beliefs, American   labor unions claim that the  activities of 
U.  S.-based multinati -mal   corporations have  resulted   in  the export of 
U.   S.   jobs,   in an adverse   impact  on  the U.  S.   balance  of  payments, and   in 
an overall   decline   in  our   balance   of   trade.     Moreover,   the   international 
nature  of   such  firms  has   put  them  beyond   the   reach  of   collective   bargain- 
ing by the  unions as well  as beyond  the   re^latory  powers of  the national 
governments   themselves.     In this context multinationals are  free of 
governmental or other restraints and  thereby possess enhanced market  power. 
in the final quotation, or what can be classified as the "disinter- 
ested-viewer" approach, the. multinational corporation is seen as neither 
benign nor malevolent.    Rather,   the   international   investment aspects  of 
.nA m he  the  results  of  rational  decision- this  phenomenon are  observed to be tne cvsuiu 
.     „       „H„.,   «oais   of lower costs and higher  (profits) making (including the two rational  goais 
.   . i..;        »c   far  as   the  employment  effects   of by the corporate entities   involved.     As  Ear as i 
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such  investment are concerned,   it would seem,   in theory,   that some  un- 
employment occurs as  the  initial   outflows of capital   and technology com- 
mence.   Whether  this  remains   abroad as   unrepatriated   income   from  these 
investments  or  re-enters  the United States   is a mattpr of  conjecture. 
Statistical   data are  not conclusive one way or t^ie other.     Investment has 
both beneficial  and detrimental effects. 
Conclusions 
With the advent  of  the  1970's organized   labor feels   itself   in a 
rather  unenviable   position.    Union membership, which  had  evidenced  much 
growth until   the  past decade,   began to decline especially in   labor's most 
productive  realm,  namely manufacturing industries.       Similarly,  employ- 
ment   in  this  vital area has also begun to decrease.     Many economists, 
among them Lawrence Krause, expect these trends  to continue as   1980 
approaches.6    Krause  notes  that the service   industries,   in which  little 
union organization is evident,   have   increased employment bv over eighty 
percent   (80*)   in  the   rast  20  vears.     At  the   same  time  employment   in  the 
.>,oods-producing  industries,  the unions'  growth  stronghold,   has only 
risen  by thirty  percent   (307,).      If  such   trends   continue,   he   further   states 
that   by   1930   the   United   States  will  enjoy comparative   advantages  only  in 
the   service   industries.     As  a consequence,  exports  and  manufacturing  as  a 
whole for that  matter,  will  become less   important in  the   international 
arena.     His conclusion:     the unions must begin to penetrate  these  service 
industries   for   if  they do not they will   no longer represent the average 
workers.    When this  happens,   the  need for organized  unionism will  no 
longer exist. 
A major cause of   the above  dll.-».  the  unions have   reasoned,   is  the 
multinational corporation.    More specifically,  the cause  is  the outflow 
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of  capital  and  technology by multinationals.     If such outflows could  be 
reduced,   then organized   labor might  survive.    With this end   in mind,   unions 
have abruptly departed   from their traditional   free trade position  to the 
■no re   protectionist position embodied   in the Burke-Hartke Act.    With their 
growth   in membership and  power threatened,  unions are abandoning  the 
tactics and  ideology that brought them jrowth   in their early history. 
For the most part,   they are unwilling to go abroad and  organize   the 
workers  there  to contest  the multinationals.     Such unions,   it must  be 
noted,  have essentially become complacent  in their 40-year reign over 
American  labor.    With  this complacency has come a sense of conservatism 
or unwillingness   to change.     In a capsule,  the unions want  to deal with 
this  new  phenomenon with old methods.    Such methods,  this writer contends, 
will  not work. 
It   is   this writer's belief  that the multinational corporation j£ 
international economics  today.    As  this  phenomenon   is new in concept,   it 
must be offset with different  methods of which international  unionism is 
a major one.     For the unions which have  tried this method, notably the 
IMF  (UAW)   and the   ICF,   some success  has been  attained.     For  this  success 
to continue, other unions must   be willing to try.    The union  fear of 
multinationals   is only of five   years' duration.    Consequently,  their 
stratagems   to  counteract   this   force  are  of  recent  origin.     However,   more 
U.  S.   unions must  be willing to make  the needed  sacrifices   if this method 
is to work.     Financial  and moral aid must be  given  to overseas workers. 
Union   information on contracts,  bargaining procedures,  grievances,  wages, 
and working conditions must be   provided on a worldwide  basis.    Wage 
harmonization for all workers,   foreign a nd  domestic,   must  become   a  union 
goal   for the future in spite of  labor's willingness to do so at  the 
12t 
present,   it   is this writer's assertion that the   trade  unions will soon 
realize  that   international   unionism may be the only way they can  survive 
in  the coming decades. 
In the   1970's   I visualize  a twofold union drive  taking  place. 
Domestically  I foresee   unions organizing the service   industries,   for this 
is  the only way they will  preserve any future  voice for the workingman 
in the 1'nited States.    Also,   I view the  union acceptance of  a compre- 
hensive   program of  adjustment assistance as designed  to help those 
goods-producing   industries  affected by the further strengthening of the 
trade  secretariats;   (2) additional emphasis on union exchange of  informa- 
tion concerning contracts, grievances,  and so forth;   (3)   increased  finan- 
cial aid  for  the  support of worldwide  strikes   plus  the   international co- 
ordination of  the  strikes  themselves;  and finally  (tt)   the beginnings of 
regional and  global wage harmonization.     One   point must be stressed, 
however:     I  foresee  these events occurring only if unions are willing to 
fight as   they did   in the early days of  their organizational drives. 
Hiding behind  protectionist  legislation,   hoping the   problem will  go away, 
is   not an answer.     The multinational  corporation is a   strong and  vital 
force   in  the   international   arena   today:   organized American   labor must  be 
just  as  strong and   vital.     In any case   protectionism is  self-defeating 
in the   long  run. 
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